tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8110639002933228971.post2240042427642928595..comments2024-03-26T05:12:36.612-04:00Comments on SCOV Law: What You Could Infer, If I Were a CarpenterDaniel Richardsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14370460563783593796noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8110639002933228971.post-25664557903298747482011-04-28T16:27:36.737-04:002011-04-28T16:27:36.737-04:00Hi Anonymous,
This may be a case where we just do...Hi Anonymous,<br /><br />This may be a case where we just do not agree. I think your point has some merit, but I still see the SCOV as tackling the extended inference issue in this case, particularly in light of its extensive Rule 303 analysis. <br /><br />Your point about the smaller inference, I would call them micro-inferences, is a bit beside the point. We make such micro-inferences with nearly every statement or bit of testimony that we introduce at trial. I agree that the SCOV is not criticizing that level of inferences. <br /><br />I also agree that the State, with better evidence could have established the basic facts and avoided this entire situation. On one level, I agree that the SCOV is chiding the lack of evidence, but the State appears to have argued that it was entitled to the permissive inference charge because of the general circumstances allowed the jury to infer the elements of the permissive inference. So while the SCOV is saying that there is not enough evidence to support the charge, it is also rebutting the argument by the state that the elements of the permissive inference could themselves be inferred from the circumstances. <br /><br />At any rate, thanks for your comments. It will be interesting to see how parties use this case in future briefs. <br /><br />As to the stalking horse reference, I was using it in the original sense of the word (literally a pretend horse used to sneak up on prey) to suggest the image of the State using the bits of inferential evidence to (metaphorically) sneak up on the element. Not my most brilliant piece of rhetoric, but what is life without a few chances and flights of fancy? Sorry for the confusion.Daniel Richardsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14370460563783593796noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8110639002933228971.post-55539485511917318932011-04-28T14:39:44.807-04:002011-04-28T14:39:44.807-04:00Don't agree. The court simply stated that the...Don't agree. The court simply stated that the basic fact must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and it wasn't here. I'm not even sure this case involved stacked inferences at all. Even if the witness had said, I called him and I spoke to him and I asked him to finish the job and he said no, there are many inferences theoretically in this scenario: the fact finder has to infer that the witness actually reached the defendant, and not someone impersonating him; that the witness's words were correctly heard and understood by the defendant; that the defendant's words were correctly heard by the witness, etc. Any simple fact can be sliced up into numerous inferences, this is why courts nowadays reject the whole stacked inferences analysis in favor of an over-all BRD in light of all of the evidence analysis. Again, I don't see a rebuke to stacked inferences here, just weak evidence of the basic fact. <br /><br />Also, minor quibble about your use of the term stalking horse. Wikipedia defines this as: A stalking horse is a person who tests a concept with someone or mounts a challenge against them on behalf of an anonymous third party. If the idea proves viable and/or popular, the anonymous figure can then declare their interest and advance the concept with little risk of failure. If the concept fails, the anonymous party will not be tainted by association and can either drop the idea completely or bide their time and wait until a better moment for launching an attack.<br /><br />I don't see how this concept ties in here.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8110639002933228971.post-50605260168450139572011-04-27T11:40:21.545-04:002011-04-27T11:40:21.545-04:00Hey Anonymous,
Good catch! The opinion is obviou...Hey Anonymous,<br /><br />Good catch! The opinion is obviously more subtle than my summary, but the point that the SCOV is making is that while reasonable inferences are acceptable, the Constitutional standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" will limit the stacking of inferences and will require proof of basic facts when an essential element of the charge is involved. Here is what the SCOV says in State v. Rounds:<br /><br />¶ 24. In order for the court to instruct the jury on a permissive inference, it must first determine the nature and legal effect of the presumed fact that would be found as a result of the inference. Rule 303(c) distinguishes between a presumed fact that “establishes guilt or is an element of the offense” and a fact that “has a lesser effect.” V.R.E. 303(c). Identifying this distinction enables the trial court to determine the standard of proof for submitting an instruction on the inference. The rule states that for the weightier elemental facts, such as whether defendant acted knowingly, the element at issue here, “the court may submit the question of guilt or the existence of the presumed fact to the jury, but only if a reasonable juror on the evidence as a whole, including evidence of the basic fact, could find guilt or the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” V.R.E. 303(c). The language of the rule on this issue is not the paragon of clarity, but reviewing it along with the entirety of the rule and other persuasive sources convinces us that the rule requires proof of the basic fact beyond a reasonable doubt before the court may submit a specific instruction on the permissive inference to the jury.<br /><br />The concern I see the SCOV articulating here is one of Constitutional standards. The State cannot get around its high burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by a series of hedges (inferences) that act as stalking horses. As you point out, it is not a ban on double stacking inferences as a rule, but it is a strong rebuke to their use in this context, albeit one that is limited to the facts of this case, the statute at issue, and the nature of the ultimate fact to be proved. What do you think?Daniel Richardsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14370460563783593796noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8110639002933228971.post-3796091596180165602011-04-27T10:43:32.917-04:002011-04-27T10:43:32.917-04:00You wrote: “Not so fast,” says the SCOV, “you are ...You wrote: “Not so fast,” says the SCOV, “you are asking us to double-stack inferences, and unlike pancakes, this cannot be done.<br /><br />I do not believe this is correct. This case is not about inferences on inferences; it is about the standard of proof for the basic facts. The Court has held that it is permissible to stack an inference on an inference, in State v. Godfrey:<br /><br />¶ 22. The only special test for inferences is that they must be reasonable. See Olds, 141 Vt. at 26, 443 A.2d at 445 (holding that facts may be proved by “reasonable inferences”). While we recognize that inferences are more likely to be unreasonable when they are based upon other inferences-which in some instances could lead to such evidence being excluded under Vermont Rule of Evidence 403 or another evidentiary rule-this does not warrant the outright ban that defendant requests here.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com