At its most basic
level, summary judgment is a way for a trial court to say, “So what?” If the facts of a case don’t support a claim
or defense, then the trial court can dispose of the matter without trial or
further fanfare. One of my favorite
college professors used to say: “There are two correct answers when it comes to
law: ‘it depends’ and ‘judicial economy.’”
The concept of summary judgment is intimately related to the latter
“correct answer.”
Summary
judgment is granted when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
That’s the kind of phrase we memorize when we’re fresh-hatched baby
lawyers; a phrase that you’d incorporate into a Chatty
Cathy—Lawyer Edition.
But what does it
really mean? Simply put, “no genuine
dispute of material fact” means that neither party disputes the significant
facts of the case. It doesn’t mean there
are no factual disputes; it just
means that all the facts on which the parties agree (or have conceded to)
support or don’t support a claim or defense, and therefore require the court to
rule only one way (that’s the matter of law piece).
To ensure fairness in
application, the court is required to view any contested facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party’s claims or defenses. The standard of review is the same at the
trial court and appellate levels.
This brings us to
today’s case. The present appeal is—you
guessed it—from a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
Here’s the backstory. Plaintiff was in a vehicle outside a
convenience store when an on-foot police officer tried to stop him for erratic
driving. This apparently prompted
Plaintiff to drive into the police officer.
So the police officer discharged his gun into the car and hit Plaintiff
in the lower back. Plaintiff drove off and after his car stops,
the police took him to a hospital for treatment.
Here, the standard of
review becomes important. Facts are
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. This means we get Plaintiff’s version of
events.
In the emergency
room, when a police officer requested a sample of Plaintiff’s blood, Plaintiff
refused. Later, Plaintiff was in a recovery
room when his nurse left. A group of
officers again asked him for a blood sample.
When Plaintiff refused, the officers held him down, covered his mouth,
and tried to take the blood by force, but they’re unsuccessful.
Then the nurse returned
and drew Plaintiff’s blood. But
according to Plaintiff, she bamboozled him: he thought she was drawing blood as
his nurse—as a medical provider—when she was really planning to hand it over to
the police.
So Plaintiff sued the
nurse and the hospital for battery (the blood draw) and negligence (leaving him
alone with the police); both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Defendants argued that Plaintiff faieds to
support his claim of medical malpractice with expert testimony and that 23
V.S.A. § 1202 provides consent for the blood draw. Plaintiff countered that he didn’t need expert
testimony to support a battery claim and that § 1202 applies only to law
enforcement officers.
The trial court agreed
with Plaintiff on the expert testimony requirement: Plaintiff alleged battery
and negligence, not medical malpractice.
The trial court concludes that there aren’t sufficient facts to
determine whether § 1202 applies.
But the trial court held
that plaintiff’s battery claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff
didn’t object to the blood draw. As the
trial court sees it, the nurse didn’t know that the police request was improper
so her actions were justifiable.
The trial court also
held that Plaintiff’s negligence claim failed.
There was no reason for the nurse to know that the police officers would
attack Plaintiff if they were left alone in a room with him, and so there’s no
violation of the duty to protect a patient from harm by third parties. Trial court granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
On appeal, the SCOV
takes a fresh look at the case, applying the same standard as the trial court. The SCOV begins its analysis by noting that
“the facts here are unquestionably in dispute.”
The question then becomes whether under Plaintiff’s version of the
facts, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The SCOV deals with
Plaintiff’s negligence claim in short order, reasoning that even with the facts
as alleged by Plaintiff, the nurse and hospital have no duty as a matter of law
to protect Plaintiff from a third-party attack without such an attack being
reasonably foreseeable. In other words,
the hospital and the nurse cannot be held responsible for the police officers’
unanticipated actions.
The SCOV begins its
analysis of the battery claim by noting that a procedure performed without
consent can be a battery, but that consent negates any battery claim.
Defendants’ first
argument, more or less, is that the circumstances imply Plaintiff’s consent:
the police had requested a blood sample, the nurse used a special labeling
procedure, and Plaintiff didn’t object.
This argument, the SCOV says, fails because it requires making
inferences in Defendants’ favor that can’t be made at the summary judgment
stage. As the SCOV explains, Plaintiff
consented to medical treatment, but not a nonmedical blood draw for evidentiary
purposes.
Defendants’ second
argument is more or less a public-policy argument: those providers who draw
blood at the request of law enforcement should be immune from civil liability. The SCOV notes that this is a departure from
the common law, and acknowledges that there are substantial policy rationales
supporting defendants’ argument—including the authorization only of specified
medical personnel to perform evidentiary blood draws. But the SCOV ultimately determines that—in
the context of a nonconsensual blood draw—the limits on civil liability are
best left to the Legislature.
The SCOV further notes that the Legislature
has limited civil and criminal liability for medical personnel in certain DUI-blood-draw
situations (such as when a person requests a second test), but not in this
situation. Because there’s no applicable
statutory immunity, the SCOV reverses the trial court’s summary judgment on the
battery claim.
And that’s the cue
for hospital administrators to start calling their legislators. This will likely be “one to watch” during the
next legislative session.
Until then, your
blood is safe from authority.
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