What Is Love? (Baby Don’t Suspend my License)

Just in case you didn't get the
reference in the title . . .
State v. Love, 2017 VT 75

By Amy Davis

This case considers when the court must hold a final hearing on a civil suspension of a driver’s license. Does the court have to hold it within 21 days of the preliminary hearing, and, if it’s not, does the civil suspension need to be dismissed. Yes and yes!

So, this statute says that when you violate this statute, meaning that if you drive under the influence, then the State has to notify you that they intend to suspend your driver’s license. If it’s your first time drinkin’ and drivin’, the suspension takes place within 11 days of receiving notice, unless you ask for a suspension hearing. Then, your license isn’t suspended unless the the court orders so, after a hearing. However, if you’ve been caught a second time, then your license is automatically suspended within 11 days of the notice, regardless of whether you ask for a suspension hearing or not.

This suspension hearing is a two-part process: a preliminary hearing and a final hearing on the merits. The preliminary hearing “shall be held within 21 ones of the alleged offense.” Then the final “to be held within 21 days of the date of the preliminary hearing” but no more than 42 days after the alleged offense without the defendant’s consent or for good cause shown. When it comes to a first offense, these limits are directive and not mandatory. The SCOV here reasons that these limits are mandatory for second or subsequent violations.

Facts are relatively simple: Police stopped defendant after a gas station disturbance. After the stop, the police sent defendant a notice of intention to automatically suspend her driver's license. The incident happened April 25, 2016, and the suspension would have taken effect on May 5, 2016. Defendant requested a hearing, and the preliminary hearing took place on May 2, 2016. The final hearing was scheduled for June 6, 2016.

On May 23, 2016, 21 days after the preliminary hearing, Defendant moved to dismiss the civil suspension hearing because the 21 days had passed since the preliminary. The State argued that the controlling timeline was 42 days, not 21. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, arguing that the 21-day rule was not controlling. Defendant appeals. Thus begins a battle between which timelines are discretional, and which are mandatory and jurisdictional.

Reviewing de novo, the SCOV sides with Defendant. The SCOV first ticks through some old cases, pointing out that this is not the first time the SCOV has interpreted time limits under this particular statute. I’m not going to go through them here because it’s a nice day outside and I would rather be drinking wine on my deck, so the sooner I wrap this up, the sooner I can work on my tan. But do feel free to review the SCOV’s opinion for further information.

The SCOV concludes the Legislature intended that for first offenses, the timeline is discretionary, and for every offense beyond that, the timeline is mandatory and jurisdictional. Thus, the trial court must comply with the 21-day and 42-day rules unless the defendant consents to a different timeline, or if the State shows good cause as to why the timelines cannot be adhered to. Because those timelines were not met in this case, Defendant’s civil suspension is dismissed, and the case is reversed.

Justice Dooley dissents, with Chief Justice Reiber joining, arguing that the Court is overreaching and reading more into the statutes than is there. Justice Dooley disagrees with the court first on the basis that there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest its intention to change the 21-day time limit to a mandatory time limit. Second, and more interestingly, Justice Dooley notes this case comes from Franklin county, “ground zero for the major docket pressures caused by opioid addiction.” Justice Dooley then goes on to cite a juvenile per curiam opinion that stresses the difficulty in meeting statutory time limits in juvenile cases. Adding more time limits decreases the judiciary’s flexibility in moving resources around to respond to the opioid crisis.

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