State v. M.W., 2012 VT
66.
Today’s case involves the criminal statute governing how a
trial court orders a psychiatric evaluation of a defendant for competency to
stand trial.
Here is the long version of how it works: the statute allows
the trial court to consider the issue if the defense, the state, or the court
believes the defendant lacks the mental capacity to stand trial for the alleged
crime. Once such a motion is made, the
trial court is required by the statute to order an immediate initial screening
by a mental health expert.
Based on this impromptu exam and the facts and circumstances
available to the trial court, it may determine whether a full examination is
warranted. The trial court is also to
determine the least restrictive environment to conduct examination with the
provision that the trial court shall not order an examination to take place in
a mental health facility, unless the preliminary examination determines that the defendant
needs treatment.
Let’s try to simplify this.
Basically, the statute says if someone during an initial hearing notices
that defendant seems crazy, catatonic, or otherwise non-cognizant of what is
going on, she can make a motion to have defendant checked out upstairs. Following this motion, the court brings a
mental health screener who makes an initial review and reports back her early
impressions. Based on this report and
other facts, the trial court has to make a judgment call—should there be a full
blown psychiatric exam, and if so, where should it take place? The only limitation is that the screener must
find the defendant in need of treatment for the trial court to be able to order
the examination to take place on an in-patient basis at a mental health
facility.
Simple, no?
Here is where the problems arose. Defendant was arrested for numerous
violations, including trespassing. At
his arraignment, questions about his competency became obvious, and upon
motion, the trial court ordered a preliminary screening. The screener stated that Defendant was
impaired, but the screener noted that Defendant was not eligible for treatment
because he was suffering from dementia, a medical condition, and not from a mental
illness.
At a hearing, the screener reaffirmed this decision. The State requested that, notwithstanding the
screener’s statement, the trial court order defendant to a psychiatric hospital
for a full evaluation. The trial court
was stymied about what to do. But in
clever two-step maneuver, the trial court ordered no evaluation. It then set bail and conditions of
release.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Defendant could not make bail and
remained in jail. Subsequently, the
trial court held a competency hearing where the defense produced an expert who
had conducted a full examination and who testified that Defendant was
incompetent. The trial court agreed,
found Defendant was a person in need of treatment, and ordered Defendant to the
state hospital.
On appeal, the State tries to revive its initial issue
concerning the evaluation and request to send Defendant to state hospital. The State argues to the extent that the
statute limits the ability of the trial court to refer a Defendant to a
psychiatric hospital for an examination, the legislature has unconstitutionally
removed an inherent power from the court.
Such is the stuff that great constitutional challenges are made. But the State’s arguments run aground on the
issue of ripeness—the basic doctrine that requires controversies to be real and
not merely academic or advisory exercises—and the challenge is never fully
made.
The problem with the State’s argument is that the trial
court never ruled on the issue that it seeks to appeal. It never ordered the examination; so it never
reached the question of where the examination should be conducted. Instead, it sidestepped the question and left
it unresolved. When legal issues are not
reached or raised, the SCOV takes a dim view of any attempt to rig them into an
appeal. So here with this issue that
never truly ripened into an actual decision.
As a result, the SCOV denies the appeal for lack of ripeness. The State tries to argue that this issue is
likely to be repeated when Defendant re-enters the system, but the SCOV is
dismissive. It similar rejects the State’s
attempt to characterize the issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction. The SCOV simply won’t engage on the
speculative facts of the case.
So the issue remains essentially undecided, but there are
some clues. Given the rejection by the SCOV,
it is likely that it found the State’s concerns to be less than compelling and
perhaps a bit overstated. There is
enough wiggle room in the statute that leaves the trial court free to reject a
screener’s determination if the circumstances suggest something different. What also seems clear is that the SCOV
believes, implicitly, that the statute does not directly interfere with the
trial court’s inherent power but gives it some structure. So unless another set of factual
circumstances forces a trial court to shed its power, the message appears to be
that as long as the trial court is conscientious of its inherent authority, it
will not have trouble applying the examination protocol in a meaningful and
constitutionally sound manner.
Such relativistic guidance might drive the State a little
crazy itself.
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