By Merrill Bent
Marsh
Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray et al., 2013
VT 6
Plaintiff in today’s case tried to beat
the establishment.
Unfortunately for her, the
“establishment” here was the property rights of others, which are protected by
another establishment: the SCOV.
The
Clash between the parties arises from Plaintiff’s
attempt to develop a lot within the Quechee Lakes subdivision in the Town of
Hartford. In 1971, the Plaintiff
purchased a “farmstead” parcel from the Quechee Lakes Corporation, comprised of
two contiguous building lots. The larger
of the two lots consisted of 5.73 acres, and the smaller, “saleable” lot
consisted of one acre.
The deed conveying the parcel referred
to certain restrictive covenants, which, among other things, limited use of the
subdivided lots to residential occupancy by a single family. It also prohibited the construction of guest
houses on the so-called farmstead parcels which, by definition, already had a
separate lot upon which accessory structures might be erected. A separate deed restriction contained setback
requirements for both the larger and smaller lots. The Plaintiff’s lots were also subject to the
Town of Hartford’s zoning regulations as well as the Town’s “Master Plan.”
Soon after purchasing the parcel, the
Plaintiff built a single-family residence on the smaller, saleable lot. After re-subdividing the lots and
reconfiguring the lot lines so that the parcels consisted of two, equally-sized
lots, the Plaintiff obtained appropriate zoning permits and built a garage with
guest accommodations upstairs. At the
time, the second lot remained undeveloped.
Seeing where this was headed,
Plaintiff’s neighbors—who we now know as the Defendants—soon complained that
any construction on the still-undeveloped, second lot would violate the deed
restriction because the lot was set back 280 feet from the road, rather than
the 70 feet called for in the deed. To
cut that opposition off at the pass, the Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
from the trial court (civil division) to legally settle her right to build a
dwelling more than 70 feet from the road.
While she waited for the wheels of
justice to turn in the trial court, the Plaintiff applied for and was granted a
permit to construct a dwelling on the second lot. The neighbors appealed, first to the Hartford
Zoning Board of Adjustment, which upheld the permit, and then to the environmental
court. There, the neighbors argued that,
because guest quarters were not allowed on farmstead parcels, the guest
accommodations constructed on the first lot should operate as the second
dwelling permitted on the two lots, and should therefore foreclose the
possibility of constructing a dwelling on the second lot.
The environmental court upheld the zoning
permit, finding that the propriety of the zoning regulations was not controlled
by the restrictive covenants on the property.
After a trial, the trial court ruled against the Plaintiff, concluding
that the restrictive covenants and deed restrictions precluded construction of
a dwelling on the second lot.
On appeal to the SCOV, Plaintiff
asserted that the statute of limitations barred the Defendants’ arguments, that
the issues were not appropriately before the trial court, and that the trial
court improperly considered extrinsic evidence to discern the meaning of the
deed restrictions and restrictive covenants.
First, the SCOV rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the
eight-year statute of limitations had run on enforcement of the restrictive
covenant. In short, the SCOV finds the
statute of limitations for enforcing a restrictive covenant starts running when
the covenant is breached. The SCOV
concludes that, where the alleged violation of the covenant concerns the
erection of a noncomplying structure, a breach occurs when construction begins,
and not, as plaintiff argued, with preparatory steps, such as reconfiguring the
lot lines.
Since plaintiff had yet to
begin construction, the actions taken in preparation for construction did not
trigger the statute of limitations. The SCOV
thus concludes that the Plaintiff was on the statute of limitations train in vain.
Plaintiff next asked: “Should
I Stay or Should I Go?” On this, the
SCOV finds that the issue was properly before the trial court. In essence, the SCOV rules that a question as
to the propriety of the zoning permit—which falls within the ambit of the environmental
court—is entirely distinct from the enforcement of the private property rights
originating in the deed restrictions and restrictive covenants. Pursuant to statute, the questions posed by Plaintiff’s
action for declaratory judgment are subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Based on similar reasoning, the SCOV holds
that the doctrines of issue preclusion and claim preclusion do not prevent the trial
court from entertaining the civil action.
Finally, while the SCOV agreed with Plaintiff that the trial
court might have improperly considered extrinsic evidence without first deciding
that the language of the deed restrictions and covenants was ambiguous, it
determines that Plaintiff is not now in a position to question that
approach.
Prior to the introduction of the extrinsic evidence at
issue, Plaintiff had already elicited similar testimony from her own witness “to
provide context for interpreting the documents.” The SCOV noted that Plaintiff’s theory of the
case at trial was that the restrictive language was ambiguous, which Plaintiff
readily conceded when the trial court sought clarification. Plaintiff was in complete control of how to present her own case; accordingly, the
SCOV rejects Plaintiff’s retrospective attempt to redefine the question before
the trial court.
Ultimately,
Plaintiff’s attempts to Rock the Casbah
were unsuccessful. The lesson here is to
make sure you carefully review and consider the restrictions that exist on your
property before you start sinking time and money into avoiding them.
Plaintiff here tried to force a round peg into a square
whole, but the SCOV saw through this and ruled accordingly.
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