By Merrill
Bent
State v. Stokes, 2013 VT
63
Remember the Hokey Pokey?
There are conflicting theories about the origin of the song
and accompanying dance, but the key to all versions is that the dancers must follow
the lyrical directions in order for it to flow.
Today’s defendant started out on the right foot, but things quickly fell
apart for him when he stopped following directions from the court.
Defendant was charged with unlawful trespass stemming from a
domestic argument with an ex-girlfriend.
During the dispute, defendant continued to stand with one foot in and
one foot out of her car, ignoring her numerous demands that he exit the vehicle—at
least until he heard approaching police sirens.
Although defendant insisted that he was never in the ex-girlfriend’s car
at any point, the jury concluded otherwise and found him guilty of unlawful
trespass. So he put his right foot in,
he put his right foot out, and after trial, defendant stood with one foot in a
jail cell.
At this point, the trial court shook things all about.
At sentencing, the State requested that the trial court impose
a special condition of probation under which defendant would be required to
complete a Domestic Abuse Education Program (DAEP). Ordinarily, DAEP is not recommended for
defendant’s type of offense, but the trial court agreed with the State’s
assessment that defendant’s unlawful conduct reflected similar dynamics to
those found in domestic abuse situations insofar as it was about exerting power
and control over the ex-girlfriend and their young son. Concluding that DAEP might help prevent
future, similar incidents, the trial court suspended defendant’s one-to-three-month
sentence and imposed DAEP as a special condition of his probation. The trial court noted that defense counsel
could move to modify the probation conditions in the event that the DAEP
facilitator determined that the program was not a good fit for defendant or
vice versa.
Thus, to avoid jail time, all defendant had to do was simply
“do the hokey pokey and turn it all around” by completing the DAEP program. Unfortunately, this is where the song and
dance fell apart.
Defendant appealed, and asked to stay the DAEP condition
pending that appeal. Defendant asserted
that a stay was mandatory under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however the
trial court concluded that, because the sentence was probationary (and his
prison sentence was suspended), a stay was discretionary under the rules and,
in this case, unwarranted because defendant’s legal challenge did not present a
close question.
Just a few months later, defendant’s probation officer filed
a violation complaint asking that defendant’s probation be revoked because he
failed to adhere to the DAEP probation condition. Defendant refused to admit to the State’s
Attorney’s information, which was a condition of enrollment in DAEP. This left him unable to enter—let alone
complete—the program as required under the terms of his probation.
The trial court denied defendant’s subsequent motion to
modify the conditions of his probation as well as his motions stay his
sentence, probation requirements, and violation-of-probation proceeding. With respect to the motions to stay, the
trial court reasoned that the circumstances had not changed since the trial
court’s earlier denial and a stay was still not warranted.
As for the motion to modify, defendant claimed that the DAEP
condition “set him up to fail” because he did not plead guilty of the crime,
and therefore could not be expected to adopt with the State’s version of
events—which, of course, had been accepted by the jury at trial. In rejecting this motion the trial court
concluded that, once the jury reaches a verdict of guilt, a defendant might
then be required to acknowledge the behavior underlying the offense and take
the steps necessary to participate in appropriate services.
After a hearing on the merits of the violation charge, the
trial court found that by refusing to complete the mandatory first step of DAEP,
defendant could not fulfill the DAEP condition and was therefore in clear
violation of the terms of his probation.
The trial court explained that, even though defendant maintained his
innocence, the sentence imposed must nonetheless be based upon the jury’s
verdict. Because the sentencing court
had determined that DAEP was appropriate under the circumstances, defendant had
to comply with the program or face incarceration, even if defendant disagreed
with it. The trial court therefore
revoked defendant’s probation, but stayed imposition of the underlying sentence
pending appeal.
Defendant appealed this revocation to the SCOV, which consolidated
it with the appeal from his conviction.
On appeal, the SCOV quickly rejects defendant’s assertion
that the State did not prove its case because a car is not a “place” as
contemplated by the unlawful trespass statute.
According to defendant’s argument, the law applies only to land,
residences, and buildings, and therefore did not apply to vehicles. The statute applies, however, to unlawful
trespass “on any land or in any place”;
accordingly, the SCOV concludes that the statute, by its plain terms (and by
common sense), applies to vehicles—which evidently fall into the broad second
category of “any place.”
Defendant next argued that the DAEP condition was not
reasonably related to the crime of which he was committed because it was not
classified as a crime of violence. On
that basis, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the DAEP condition. The SCOV concludes
that the trial court provided a reasonable basis for its determination and that
the sentence imposed was consistent with the law.
Turning to the violation of parole, defendant asserts that
the DAEP condition required him to admit to facts that were recited in the
State’s information but not necessarily the facts found by the jury. The SCOV agrees with the trial court that,
contrary to defendant’s assertions, he had the choice—however disagreeable—to
either comply with the terms of probation or to refuse and face the
consequences of violation.
In a related, final argument, defendant asserts that he was
never specifically requested to admit to the conduct underlying his conviction,
so his refusal to do so could not have been the reason he did not complete (or
even enter) DAEP. Based on that logic,
defendant claims error in the trial court’s finding that he violated probation.
In addressing this argument, the SCOV cites testimony from
both the DAEP coordinator and defendant’s probation officer that defendant
refused to admit to the offense underlying the sentence, and that he was
required to do so in order to be admitted into the program. The SCOV also points out that, even if the
DAEP coordinator did not distinguish between the facts in the State’s
information and the specific findings of the jury, defendant steadfastly
maintained his innocence, refusing to admit any wrongful conduct at all. Accordingly, the SCOV finds that the evidence
supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant refused to admit to his
offense and that he was denied admission to the DAEP program on that basis.
Rather than stick with the dance that many children can
easily master and follow the simple steps required to avoid prison time, defendant
chose instead to tango with the court, and his situation quickly devolved to
the point that it could no longer be turned around. Things would certainly have gone a lot more
smoothly for defendant had he chosen to go through the motions as ordered by
the court.
And who knows, perhaps he might even have benefitted from accepting
services—that is, after all, what it‘s all about!
Comments
Post a Comment