This case arises from a car accident. On his way to work, defendant—with several
coworkers in his truck and at some speed above the posted limit—passed a
coworker’s vehicle and collided with a third car. The driver of that car died from injuries;
defendant broke his leg. Defendant was charged
with grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle, death resulting.
A deputy sheriff—certified as an accident reconstructionist by
some fancy police organization—investigated the accident and did some on-site
testing, which included drag-sled (a weighted sled used to measure drag on
surfaces) testing and a bunch of math stuff.
He concluded defendant was driving at 61 miles per hour, and so
testified at trial.
Of course, defendant tried to keep that testimony out, filing a
pretrial motion to exclude under Vermont’s “what-is-an-expert-exactly . . .”
rule—Vermont Rule of Evidence 702. The
trial court denied defendant’s motion.
And so at trial, the coworkers in defendant’s truck testified and
defendant had his own expert testify that the state’s expert was full of
pre-processed sandwich meat. The jury
acquitted defendant of grossly negligent operation, but convicted defendant of
negligent operation.
Before sentencing, defendant tried to get the trial court to rule
that “the decedent’s family members could not be ‘victims’ entitled to speak at
the sentencing hearing.” Defendant’s
argument was primarily semantic and focused on the statutory definition of
victim, and a lack of causal connection between the offense he was convicted of
and decedent’s death.
At sentencing, the trial court rejected both the state’s and
defendant’s speed estimates, weighing in somewhere in the middle. The trial court also found that defendant’s
negligence was the proximate cause of decedent’s death, based in part on the
parties’ stipulation that the accident caused the decedent’s death. Decedent’s mother was allowed to speak as a
victim; defendant spoke on his own behalf.
Defendant ended up with a
sentence of 30 days to one year, with 30 days to serve and a three-year term of
probation. He appealed.
Defendant’s first argument is that the trial court should’ve
excluded the state’s expert. The SCOV
discusses this point at some length, but finds no error. The SCOV notes that the trial court acts as
the gatekeeper for expert testimony, and that this means the trial court has
wide discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude such testimony.
Rule 702’s purpose is to separate the science from the scientician and to
exclude “junk science”—that is, so-called “scientific” evidence that is of a
custom-fabricated-for-litigation variety.
Here, the SCOV notes that the expert’s calculations were based on
reliable-enough methods and principles.
The flaws in the expert’s methodology (mostly relating to the drag sled
use) went more to the weight of the evidence than threshold admissibility. The SCOV also notes that the proper
adversarial back-and-forth between the experts played out as it should in
court. And so all was as it should
be.
Despite the suggestive title of this summary, the SCOV finds no
error in the trial court’s refusal to exclude the state’s expert’s testimony
(thus answering our query, boys and girls, in the negative).
Defendant’s next argument is that at sentencing, the trial court
improperly determined facts and allowed impermissible victim-impact
testimony.
The SCOV begins its discussion by reviewing the generally broad
victim-definition and the
victim-unavailable-then-a-family-member-may-address-the-court provisions of
Vermont’s statutory sentencing scheme.
The court below found that decedent was a victim of defendant’s
convicted-of crime and that defendant’s negligent operation of the vehicle was
the proximate cause of decedent’s death.
Accordingly, decedent’s mother was allowed to testify at sentencing and
her testimony was one of many factors the trial court considered in imposing defendant’s
sentence.
The SCOV notes that the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure allow
a prosecutor to introduce “any information relevant to sentencing” at
sentencing. The SCOV concludes “that the
sentencing court was well within its discretion when it found that defendant’s
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and considered the facts of
the fatality resulting from the crash, including its impact on the decedent’s
mother, at sentencing.” The SCOV further
notes: (1) that the acquittal on gross negligent operation did not resolve
causation as a matter of law; (2) that while causation is not an essential
element of negligent operation, that doesn’t make it irrelevant or improperly considered at
sentencing.
Defendant argues that a case dealing with restitution
principles with a
similar procedural history supports his contention that the trial court should
not have considered the decedent’s mother’s testimony at sentencing. The SCOV rejects this argument, reasoning
that the restitution is much more limited in scope than victim-impact
principles, despite identical statutory definitions, in both cases, of
“victim.”
And that’s it. An expert’s
methodology need not be perfect and a deceased victim’s family member can
testify at sentencing—though it’s worth noting that the same family member
likely would not be entitled to restitution.
Have a safe drive home, and watch your speed.
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