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| Catching some rays of hope? |
By Amy Davis
Allco appeals from the Public Service Board which apparently denied some sort of request, and then denied a motion to reconsider its original denial. Allco argues that the Board was supposed to award standard-offer contracts to several solar projects because they provided “sufficient benefits” to the operation of Vermont’s electric grid.
The projects Allco refers to are part of Vermont’s Sustainably Priced Energy Enterprise Development (SPEED), which promote renewable energy in Vermont. The program is so important that the Legislature made it official in this statute. It allows the Public Service Board the authority to offer power-purchase contracts to new renewable-energy plants. There are two types of contracts included in subsections (c) and (d). Each contract has specific qualifications. These subsections require the Board to issue standard offer contracts until a certain cumulative plant capacity is reached. The first type of contract, under subsection (c), involves the Board sets a capacity and then receives proposals to fill that capacity. The second type of contract, under subsection (d), applies to plants that do not count towards cumulative capacity, including the plants that provide “sufficient benefits” to the electric grid. Sufficient benefits means that the plant must be “intended to mitigate transmission and distribution constraints, as opposed to those that provide more generalized benefits.”
On to the facts of the case!
In April 2016, the standard-offer facilitator sent out a request looking for proposals to meet the cumulative capacity standard-offer contracts. The request specifically cited subsection (c) of the statute and specified that annual capacity in 2016 was 6.375 megawatts. The facilitator received twenty-four proposals, and after allocation, had approximately 3.875 megawatts of plant capacity remaining for solar projects.
Allco submitted eleven of eighteen solar project proposals, with the total of all eighteen proposals coming in at 37.23 megawatts (far more than what was available). The Board filled the remaining 3.875 megawatts with the lowest-priced proposals. The Board offered two solar projects standard-offer contracts, Allco being one of them.
Allco filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the Board should award standard offer contracts to the remaining eligible proposals submitted. Allco stated that all eligible proposals should be awarded contracts outside the cumulative capacity, because each satisfied the “sufficient benefits” test. The Board denied this request, stating that the request was for proposals for the cumulative capacity requirements, and that the Board did not invoke the sufficient-benefits test because it awarded contracts outside the cumulative capacity requirement.
Allco argues on appeal that the framework of the sufficient benefits test in subsection (d) applies. Allco argues that the Board’s interpretation of the statute’s language erroneously limits the sufficient benefits test. The SCOV notes that the Board awarded its original contracts under subsection (c), and the Board’s process did not invoke subsection (d). Also, Allco improperly raised its claim below. For this reason, the SCOV decides not to address this claim on appeal. Furthermore, the request for proposals was specific to subsection (c), and the entire process was conducted under that subsection, so subsection (d) does not apply.
Allco filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the Board should award standard offer contracts to the remaining eligible proposals submitted. Allco stated that all eligible proposals should be awarded contracts outside the cumulative capacity, because each satisfied the “sufficient benefits” test. The Board denied this request, stating that the request was for proposals for the cumulative capacity requirements, and that the Board did not invoke the sufficient-benefits test because it awarded contracts outside the cumulative capacity requirement.
Allco argues on appeal that the framework of the sufficient benefits test in subsection (d) applies. Allco argues that the Board’s interpretation of the statute’s language erroneously limits the sufficient benefits test. The SCOV notes that the Board awarded its original contracts under subsection (c), and the Board’s process did not invoke subsection (d). Also, Allco improperly raised its claim below. For this reason, the SCOV decides not to address this claim on appeal. Furthermore, the request for proposals was specific to subsection (c), and the entire process was conducted under that subsection, so subsection (d) does not apply.
Thus, the SCOV affirms.
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