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State v. Sawyer, 2018 VT 43 (mem.)

One day after the shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida left seventeen people dead, Jack Sawyer was arrested and was charged with four felony complaints for allegedly attempting to cause a mass shooting at Fair Haven Union High School. One count alleged that he attempted to cause bodily injury to another with a dangerous weapon. Another alleged that he attempted to commit first-degree murder. The remaining two counts alleged that he attempted to commit aggravated murder.

At his arraignment, Sawyer entered pleas of not guilty, and the trial judge ordered him held without bail.

Vermont law generally prohibits defendants from being held without bail, but makes an exception when two elements are satisfied: one, the defendant is charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment and, two, the evidence of guilt is great. In Sawyer’s case, the trial judge ruled that the State had satisfied its burden with respect to both prongs.

Sawyer appeals, and a three-judge panel of the Vermont Supreme Court begs to differ with the trial court judge.

The Court first takes a look at the facts upon which the trial court relied when it concluded that the State had established that the evidence of the crime was great. 

One, Sawyer had written messages on Facebook that “[j]ust a few days ago I was still plotting on shooting up my old high school so it’s not like I really wanted a future anyways.” Two, Sawyer told police during an interview that he had planned on committing a mass shooting at the school in 2016 and stated that until a week or two prior to the interview he was still thinking about committing a school shooting at Fair Haven. Three, he had discussed school shootings a day or two earlier in his Facebook messages. Four, he stated that he needed to go to the school before the shooting to observe the School Resource Officer’s habits and patterns of behavior in preparation for a shooting, since that officer would likely be the only one who could stop him. Five, he had converted money from his bank account to Bitcoin and had installed a browser to allow him to access the dark web where he could purchase a handgun. Six, he wanted to exceed the body count of the shooting at Virginia Tech and had chosen his ammunition accordingly. Seven, he wanted to commit a mass shooting on the anniversary date of the Columbine school shooting, but Fair Haven wouldn’t be in session on that day, so he decided instead that he would commit the shooting on March 14th. Eight, after Sawyer was detained, police searched his car and found a shotgun and 17 rounds of ammunition, four books related to school shootings, including the Columbine massacre, and the defendant’s journal. Nine, the journal, entitled “The Journal of an Active Shooter,” included passages in which Sawyer expressed suicidal ideation, the desire to commit “suicide by homicide,” the plan to commit suicide “in a bigger and better way than just the stereotypical suicide,” and several references to his specific plan to shoot up the high school.

The Court holds that the foregoing is not enough to establish an “attempt” under current Vermont law. It has long been the rule that “attempt” consists of two components: one, a intent to commit a crime and, two, an act that, but for an interruption, would result in completion of the crime. Mere preparation to commit a crime does not, as a matter of law, constitute “attempt.” Thus, for instance, a century earlier the Court had thrown out a conviction for attempting to break out of jail where the defendant, an inmate, was found in possession of a bundle of 12 hacksaws which an accomplice had tossed to him through the bars covering an open window in the jail. More recently, it had held that if someone is holding a bottle over his head and advancing on a second person, he has not committed the crime of attempt to assault.

With respect to all of the things that the State alleges Sawyer did in preparation for his mass shooting,the Court concludes that each of the defendant’s acts was a “preparatory act,” and not an act “undertaken in the attempt to commit a crime.” Since, as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the defendant’s acts did not fall within the definition of an attempt, the Court holds that the trial court erred in concluding that the “evidence of guilt is great,” and remands the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s decision.

Reflecting perhaps its own discomfort with the result it has reached, the three-judge panel also takes a moment to remind the legislature that the business of establishing what constitutes an “attempt” is one for the legislative branch of government. In conclusion, the Court writes, the legislature “can, if it chooses, deviate from this long-established standard by passing a law revising the definition of attempt.”

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