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| A different kind of standing |
By Andrew Delaney
What exactly is an “interested person” in the context of a guardianship for a developmentally disabled adult? I’m glad you asked because it just so happens that’s just what SCOV considers in this case.
C.H. is a developmentally disabled adult and has been under a guardianship since 2009. In 2015 her first guardian—an immediate family member—was removed for financial exploitation, and the Department of Aging and Independent Living (DAIL) became C.H.’s guardian. In 2017, Ms. Boulet aka “petitioner” moved to modify the guardianship so she could be C.H.'s guardian, alleging that she had known C.H. since C.H. was a child; that she is C.H.’s godmother and had known C.H.’s mother since they were little kids. Ms. Boulet also noted that C.H. is her “honorary niece,” and that she cared greatly about what happened to C.H.
C.H.’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Ms. Boulet lacked standing. The trial court agreed and dismissed petitioner’s motion to modify without any hearing because it concluded that petitioner lacked standing to modify a guardianship.
Ms. Boulet appeals.
First we deal with the ol’ plain-meaning bit. In interpreting a statute, SCOV looks first to the plain and normal meaning of the words. Only if it’s unclear after that exercise do we start bringing in other stuff. SCOV notes that the statutes regarding guardianships read together indicate that a motion to modify can only be filed by “a responsible adult who has a direct interest in a person with developmental disabilities.” Because standing is jurisdictional, the issue before SCOV is narrow: “The sole issue presented here is whether petitioner meets the statutory definition of an ‘interested person,’ such that she has standing to petition the court for a modification of C.H.’s guardianship.”
Under the applicable statute an “interested person”—someone with a personal interest in the ward—can move to modify a guardianship for a developmentally disabled adult. “Direct interest” is a bit harder to define, so SCOV breaks out the dictionary and looks to states with language like “interested in the welfare of” in their respective statutes.
I’m not going to do the same rundown that SCOV does. Mostly because I’m lazy but also because the bottom line is easily articulated: SCOV concludes that “interested person” in this context includes folks that have a personal relationship with the ward that includes a degree of “personal attentiveness.” And petitioner here demonstrated enough of that to warrant a hearing on that relationship. Getting bounced on a motion to dismiss was not cool.
So SCOV reverses solely on the issue of standing. There was enough in the petition to at least warrant an evidentiary hearing on whether petitioner has standing as an “interested person.”
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