By Andy DelaneyNow here's a homonym
One case on April 8th. It involves comity, which I’m not embarrassed to admit, I had to look up. In this context, comity means respecting the authority of or deferring to other courts—even family courts in Massachusetts—to issue orders and dispose of assets located in Vermont.
Let’s back up.
But first an aside. Watch this spoof Dunkin’ commercial.
Husband and wife (now ex-) were Massachusetts residents with a second home in Vermont. When they got divorced (in Massachusetts) the Massachusetts court appointed a special master to sell the Vermont property. That had its own jurisdictional issues, including a dismissed petition (on husband’s motion) to domesticate the on-appeal-so-not-yet-final Massachusetts order so the special master could sell the Vermont property. Eventually, a deed gets issued and husband (plaintiff) tries to get the sale invalidated and rescinded on grounds that the special master didn’t have authority and that the special master should be held in contempt for violating the dismissal of the domestication proceeding. Still with me?
Both the special master and the purchaser moved to dismiss. The trial court granted the motions, acknowledging that while it would have authority to quiet title to Vermont property, under comity principles, it was going to defer to the Massachusetts court on this one. Husband appeals.
On appeal, SCOV reasons that the
proper standard of review is abuse of discretion and rejects husband’s de novo
proposal. This is because a dismissal on comity grounds is based on judicial
economy, not a rule of law. And so, SCOV reviews the dismissal of husband’s
action and reasons “dismissal serves the purpose of the comity doctrine by
avoiding multiple or inconsistent judgments that could result from both Vermont
and Massachusetts courts adjudicating this claim.” SCOV also reasons that the
procedural posture—plaintiff had appealed the Massachusetts orders at the time
the special master’s petition to domesticate the Massachusetts order was
dismissed—mattered because the reason the domestication petition was dismissed
was not because the special master lacked authority, but because the
Massachusetts order was not yet final. Look, it’s a little convoluted but the
bottom line is that the potential for inconsistent judgments and litigation of
the same issues in different jurisdictions seems a good reason for a trial
court to defer to an out-of-state court on comity grounds. Nijensohn v. Ring,
2022
VT 16.
Comments
Post a Comment