I've been traveling since Thursday, November 7th, which is one reason why we're doing a little catch-up today. There are other reasons too, but "traveling" sounds legitimate to me. SCOV issued three opinions on the 8th and one opinion on the 15th.
The first opinion from the 8th is about law enforcement and professional conduct. The Vermont Criminal Justice Council concluded that the Franklin County Sheriff engaged in gross professional misconduct and permanently revoked his law-enforcement officer certification based on an incident where he kicked someone in police custody for no legitimate reason. He doesn't challenge the findings, but makes a conflict-of-interest argument based primarily on the prosecuting attorney also being general counsel for the Council. SCOV is not persuaded. First, SCOV notes that the Code of Judicial Conduct—which respondent argues is applicable here—doesn't generally apply to administrative proceedings. SCOV, while noting that it's not a "slavish adherent" to precedent, declines respondent's invitation to overturn the case articulating this principle. SCOV also rejects respondent's I-was-denied-due-process argument, reasoning that there wasn't a due-process-violating mixing of roles here. SCOV affirms the Council's decision. In re Grismore, 2024 VT 70.
The second opinion from the 8th takes up the issue of whether the civil division has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a case involving disability discrimination in the context of the town denying a zoning variance. The Human Rights Commission brought action on behalf of a disabled resident under the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA). The town successfully argued below that only the environmental division has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear zoning appeals and the trial court dismissed the case. That's a short-lived victory, however, because SCOV concludes that the civil division has subject-matter jurisdiction over all VFHPAA claims. SCOV also reasons that the VFHPAA takes priority over the finality provisions of the zoning-appeal scheme. SCOV then notes that despite the trial court's contrary conclusion, the Human Rights Commission is not an "interested person" under that scheme (which would pull the Commission into those finality provisions, at least arguably). This one gets reversed and remanded. Human Rights Commission v. St. Johnsbury, 2024 VT 71.
The last opinion for the 8th involves service of process, timeliness of motions, commencement of actions, and the savings statute (allowing one year to recommence an action dismissed based on "unavoidable accident" or "default or neglect" of the process server). Here, SCOV concludes that because plaintiff's lack of service on an individual defendant in a multiple-defendant case was not on the basis of an unavoidable accident or the process server's screw-up, the savings statute doesn't apply. So, even though plaintiff commenced a prior action within the applicable statute of limitation, the second action—filed after the statute had run—was time barred. Plaintiff had some decent reasons for why service wasn't completed (or a motion to extend wasn't filed) in the first case but SCOV isn't in a forgiving mood on the service-of-process-compliance front. There's plenty more to it (because isn't there always?), but the bottom line is that SCOV appears to be favoring strict compliance with the rules of civil procedure governing service of process and applying the savings statute narrowly (as one might expect). SCOV affirms the trial court's dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds. Doe v. Camacho, 2024 VT 72.
Our lone opinion on the 15th is about whether a road breaks contiguity when contiguity is required for a project to qualify as a "priority housing project" (subsection 35 of this statute if you're curious). The environmental division reasoned that applicant's both-sides-of-the-road project involved "multiple contiguous tracts of land." Neighbors disagreed and asked SCOV to take a look. According to SCOV—and to neighbors' dismay—a road does not break contiguity for purposes of a priority-housing-project determination. Accordingly, SCOV affirms the trial court's decision concluding that the project in question is, in fact, a priority housing project. In re Windham Windsor Housing Trust, 2024 VT 73.
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