No "opinions" this week but there were three published entry orders, one each on the 12th, 13th, and 14th. The big difference between a published entry order and an opinion, to the best of my knowledge, is that the entry order doesn't have a specified author (unpublished entry orders are usually three-justice opinions). This makes me chuckle because it could be used in the I-didn't-write-that! sense as well as the we-all-wrote-it-together sense. Plausible deniability perhaps? Did I digress again? Oops.
First up we have an attorney discipline case. Respondent is a Vermont-licensed attorney who was disbarred in North Carolina in 2015. I didn't notice the 2015 disbarment date when I first glanced at the opinion, err, entry order yesterday. Ten years, huh?
Anywho, the underlying facts are that in North Carolina, between 2009 and 2011, respondent took $21,500 in funds from an estate while he was the estate's administrator by disbursing it to himself without court approval. He also filed false and fraudulent accountings over the next couple years. The court eventually approved fees of a few grand less than what respondent paid himself. He got caught. So he gave up his license in North Carolina and got disbarred. He didn't tell Vermont about it.
Lawyers are human. They make mistakes. Sometimes those mistakes are serious. The more serious the mistake, the more important it is to take full and unfettered responsibility. Professional responsibility proceedings are not the place to explain away errors. Such attempts, in my opinion, will not only be ineffective, they'll more often than not backfire.
With that little rant out of the way, I feel like we know enough to predict the outcome here. Vermont also disbars respondent. He makes some arguments—and I don't want to be too judgy here but I'm gonna be a little judgy—that he probably shouldn't have. SCOV notes: "There are no findings by the North Carolina court supporting respondent’s explanations for his conduct." In a nutshell, he argues that he was just negligent and it wasn't really that bad. Also, he figured the court would report him, which is why he didn't bother telling anyone he got his NC bar card yoinked. As one might expect, this gets him absolutely nowhere. SCOV imposes reciprocal discipline. In re Ragaller, 2025 VT 14 (mem.)
Next up, we have a short—four-paragraph—opinion on tolling an appeal period. This a purely procedural opinion. SCOV notes that in 2006 it amended Appellate Rule 4 to include "any motion filed under Rule 60 within ten days of the judgment" tolls the appeal period. SCOV denies the State's motion to dismiss the appeal based on a Rule 60 motion to correct a clerical error not tolling the appeal period. With the 2006 amendment, tolling happens. Of note there is a 1989 opinion referenced in the order—and relied on by the State—that will now likely get a "flag" something along the lines of "superseded by rule as acknowledged in . . . " In re A.B., 2025 VT 12 (mem.)
For the third entry order this week, we have a hold-without-bail appeal. The sole footnote in the opinion is something that I don't think we'd be seeing were it not for "the panny." It reads: "Chief Justice Reiber was present for the remote oral argument but had intermittent connectivity problems. After the hearing concluded, he listened to the recording of the entire hearing."
There are no big surprises here, but there's a quirk. Mr. Sartwell was charged with some heavy-duty driving offenses, including three felonies, one of which was what many states call "grand theft auto" but we in Vermont call "aggravated operating without owner’s consent." The State added a habitual-offender enhancement, which moved Mr. Sartwell's charges into punishable-by-life territory. And the trial court ordered Mr. Sartwell held without bail.
Here's the quirk. In October 2023, "defendant was accidentally released by law enforcement despite the court order holding him without bail." Sadly, this entry order does not explain how one gets "accidentally" released from jail. Defendant was then arrested on "new, unrelated charges in another county" a year after "accidentally" being released.
The trial court found that there was an offense charged punishable by life in prison and that the evidence of guilt was great. This creates a (discretionary) presumption against release.
Nonetheless, the trial court considered the discretionary factors under this statute, and concluded that Mr. Sartwell ought be held without bail.
Mr. Sartwell appeals. He argues that the trial court should have made findings about whether there was some combination of cash bail and conditions that would protect the public and mitigate risk of flight.
SCOV disagrees. SCOV reasons, "The trial court’s order amply supported its decision to hold defendant without bail." SCOV notes that the trial court applied the correct standard; that there's a presumption against release; and that the trial court still considered all the potential factors. SCOV reasons that the trial "court made findings and clearly articulated the government’s interest in holding defendant without bail." SCOV also explains that once the presumption to hold without bail arises, the burden shifts to the defendant to convince the court to let the defendant out. That didn't happen here, unfortunately for Mr. Sartwell. State v. Sartwell, 2025 VT 13 (mem.)
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