Pretext and Procedure

I call this the "McDonald's
burger-shifting analysis" 

By Andy Delaney

I might know enough about employment law to sound like I know what I'm talking about. But I'm no expert. 

Robert Caldwell was Champlain College's chief fundraiser from January 2017 until September 2019. During this period, he missed his fundraising targets. In 2019, he was pretty far behind. Now, in May 2019, Caldwell received a chronic kidney disease diagnosis. He told the then-president about the condition. 

But then an interim president came on board in June 2019, and immediately focused in on fundraising as an area of concern. Plaintiff got fired in September, with the interim president citing fundraising numbers as the reason. 

Plaintiff sued for disability discrimination and promissory estoppel. There was some discovery and Champlain filed the inevitable (in employment claims) motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Champlain's motion. 

Mr. Caldwell appeals. 

I predict paragraph 7 of this opinion is going to be quoted a lot by defendants seeking summary judgment. There's nothing wrong with it, but it does include quotes like: "[W]here the jury could only find for the plaintiff by relying on speculation, the defendant is entitled to [summary] judgment."      

One thing to keep in mind on summary judgment is the nonmovant's separate statement of additional material facts. It can be important because the trial court (and later SCOV) will apply the procedure strictly. "The court need consider only the materials cited in the required statements of fact." Here, SCOV notes that Mr. Caldwell "did not file his own statement of additional material facts" (although he did file a separate response). And so, the trial court only considered Champlain's statement of undisputed facts. SCOV follows suit. 

In employment law claims, there's a burden-shifting analysis on summary judgment. Essentially, if plaintiff makes out a case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some neutral, non-discriminatory reason for the firing. The burden then shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. You don't need to take my word for it, though, there's a Wikipedia entry on the very thing.   

On the disability discrimination claim, SCOV reasons plaintiff couldn't provide evidence suggesting Champlain's reason for termination was pretextual. Though he argues that another employee who missed goals wasn't fired and that budget cuts affected his performance, SCOV reasons the facts supporting those arguments are not properly before the Court. In regard to hypothetical questions asking SCOV to ponder why things unfolded the way they did, SCOV sidesteps and says it would have to speculate (see the reference to paragraph 7 above). 

In a similar vein, SCOV concludes that the promissory estoppel claim fails because Mr. Caldwell sets forth no evidence of any specific and actionable promise made by the former president. 

So, SCOV affirms the trial court's summary judgment ruling. I don't want to speculate, but there does seem to be a little selective application of procedure here in favor of the College. But what do I know? Caldwell v. Champlain College, Inc., 2025 VT 17.