
See also: summarizes SCOV opinions
By: Elizabeth Kruska
Beaming in from HQ as I try to go on vacation. I haven’t packed. I hate packing. Instead of packing I’ll summarize some SCOV opinions, because that will make packing go faster. It won’t but that’s what I’m telling myself.
We’ve got three opinions this week. I’ll start with In re Petition of VT Real Estate Holdings 1 LLC/In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC, 2026 VT 13. This is a combination of two cases where the issue is similar. Briefly, in each case, a developer sought a certificate of public good (CPG) from the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to do some sort of project. In each case, groups of residence sought intervenor status and tried to oppose the requests. The CPGs were granted, and the neighbors tried to appeal. In both cases, the developers moved to dismiss because the notices of appeal were untimely. Right there in the first paragraph, SCOV says the motions were timely and thus tolled any time to file an appeal and denied the motions to dismiss. SCOV marches through some prior similar cases and finds that it’s consistently ruled in the same way.
There’s a dissent from Justice Nolan who is new and who has already written another dissent and this is very interesting to me as a trial court attorney because sometimes there’s significant wisdom in dissents and sometimes dissents become very useful. She points out that the appeal was filed late and she would have granted the developers’ motions to dismiss.
Moving on, because that suitcase ain’t packing itself.
Up next is State v. Courtney Samplatsky, 2026 VT 16. This is a bail appeal entry order. The court affirmed the lower court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to review bail. You could stop here, or you could read more of what I have to say.
If you’ve stayed with me, here’s the story. Defendant was charged with second degree murder and aggravated assault in 2022. She was held without bail because that’s what can happen in a case where the maximum possible penalty is life imprisonment. She had a weight of the evidence hearing, but stopped short of asking for a bail hearing at that point. She then created a release plan a few years later and sought a bail review. Her plan involved safe housing, transportation, and a therapeutic component.
The court took testimony and, within its discretion, denied the bail motion. She appealed. She argued the trial court wanted her to “guarantee perfect safety” when all that is required is whether bail conditions could reasonably manage risk. SCOV says the trial court took a broad view of the facts and circumstances and acted within its discretion to deny the motion. She also argued the trail court drew an inappropriate conclusion about her risk of flight due to her mental health status. SCOV doesn’t answer this because it doesn’t have to because it decided the court was correct on the first point. So – affirmed.
Home stretch, y’all.
Last up is In re Miriam Thomas, 2026 VT 12. This opinion is kind of long, but it boils down to this: a probate court held an evidentiary hearing, SCOV says this was permissible to do, and while it affirms, it also remands the matter to the civil division for further proceedings.
This case involves six siblings (including a Bruce and a Bryce and that had to have been confusing at the dinner table) and a guardianship of their elderly mother. In short, sibling Bruce sought to become Miriam’s guardian as she aged. Siblings Paul and Mary opposed Bruce. Sibling Paul counter-filed to become the guardian. Siblings Bruce, Elizabeth, and Bryce opposed that. This feels like an LSAT question. In the long run, Paul was appointed to be the guardian and was required to manage lots of assets. The other siblings were not happy with how things went (this is very boiled-down) and eventually moved to have him removed as the guardian. There were allegations of mismanagement, and the siblings sought to have Paul reimburse Miriam’s estate. An attorney was appointed to become the financial guardian as a result. That same attorney also became the executor of her estate when she passed several months later.
I’m going to tl;dr this for you because it’s long and sort of reads like a tennis match volleying back and forth between the probate and civil divisions and whether there’s subject matter jurisdiction or not. It finally got to the point where Paul sought interlocutory appeal with the question as to whether the probate division had subject matter jurisdiction over a hearing in 2020. Paul’s argument was that the probate hearing was less of a probate hearing and more like an adjudication of a tort claim brought by his siblings against him because it sought money damages.
SCOV points out the probate court has limited power. On the other hand, just because the relief sought looked like a tort doesn’t make it so. It’s like that “is it cake?” thing. Sometimes it’s cake. Sometimes it’s a lawn chair. Sometimes it’s a cake made to look like a lawn chair.
SCOV says this is a guardianship and that the guardianship statutes give the probate division “exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings brought under the authority of this chapter.” A guardian has a fiduciary duty to his or her ward and their estate. If a person interested in the ward’s welfare has concerns, they can move to terminate or modify the guardianship. Financial guardians have to update the court about the ward’s finances. The probate court can modify or terminate a guardianship. The court can also supervise the guardian.
SCOV determines that the 2020 hearing was about supervision of Paul as the guardian. Concerns were raised about how the finances were handled. The court was within its right to have this hearing. Part of the court’s regulatory role could include reimbursement to the estate, which is what the court ordered here. Paul appealed to the civil division; that was dismissed. SCOV affirms that dismissal and sends the matter back to the civil division for further proceedings.
That’s it. I’m out of here. We’ll find out when we get there if I packed any socks.
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