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While most of us have been outside soaking up summer sunshine SCOV has been indoors cranking out opinions. There are six this week, and because we here at HQ are all about fairness and equity and not doing too much work when we don’t have to, I deputized myself to make the decision we’d split them. Then I split them and told Delaney about the plan and then executed the plan. These summaries might be posted before he reads my texts. Pitter patter, let’s get at ‘er.
Wakefield v. Wakefield, 2026 VT 34 is first, and it’s an appeal of interpretation of a premarital agreement. The parties got married, and before they did, they signed a premarital agreement. The spirit was generally that if they divorced they’d each keep what they brought to the marriage. Most importantly was that Husband entered the marriage with a farmhouse that his family lived in on their farm for eight generations. He’d get to keep the house in a divorce. Of some interest is that he also signed a will at or about the same time that would give Wife a life estate in the farmhouse if he predeceased her. Now, I’m no detective, but these facts all suggest strongly to me that Husband very much wanted to keep that house in the family.
Unfortunately, the parties later split up and headed for divorce. Wife argued to the court that it should disregard the prenup because to do otherwise would leave her destitute. The court agreed and fashioned a property award that considered the house, finding the clauses about the house to be unconscionable. It ordered Husband to pay Wife a sum of money, and if he couldn’t, he’d have to sell the house. That his family owned for eight generations. And that he sought to protect in two different ways. Unsurprisingly, Husband appealed, and SCOV reversed.
Here’s the thing. Premarital agreements are contracts and are construed as such. The contract was not unconscionable and didn’t create a windfall. It was executed and expressed the parties’ interests and goals at the time it was executed, and each party had information sufficient to enter the contract freely and voluntarily. SCOV says the whole point and scope of the agreement was clear. SCOV also points out that while we have a statute about how to divide property in the event of a divorce, parties are free to deviate from that by making a contract ahead of time. SCOV also points out the house isn’t a windfall to Husband; his family owned it since Vermont was a republic (maybe not that long, but a long time), and he lived in it before he married Wife.
There are also times when parties constructively abandon a prenup. Wife tried to argue that somehow the fact Husband made a will with a life estate was abandonment of the contract. But that didn’t make sense, given the fact it was done within a day of creating the prenup, and was clearly done as a part of the transaction.
So, SCOV gives a hefty no thank you, reverses, and sends this back to the trial court for additional proceedings.
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Up next we have Rosetti v. Bare, Ltd. And Jamie Spano, 2026 VT 28, which is an employment dispute case. Plaintiff (Rosetti) sued her former employer, Defendant, with a claim that she was underpaid with respect to bonuses in 2018 and 2019, and that she was terminated in 2020 so the company could avoid having to pay her a bonus. The parties tried the case, and the defendants prevailed. Plaintiff appealed. SCOV affirmed the judgment but remanded, as the defendants had sought attorney fees, and SCOV feels this needs to be reconsidered.
There’s a lot going on here and I’ll boil it down as much as I can. Plaintiff worked for Defendant’s company. The parties had an agreement that if the company had certain revenues each year, it would pay Plaintiff a particular bonus. The problem ultimately became that the parties didn’t seem to agree about what the terms meant that actually led to the bonuses being paid. Because the evidence at trial actually showed that the revenue fell short of what would trigger the bonuses, the court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff also made a claim for a payout of PTO and a bonus in 2020. She was eligible to get the bonus if she worked the full calendar year, but was fired in December. She argued she had 3 weeks of PTO available and that the firing was in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing – essentially they fired her so they wouldn’t have to pay her bonus. She argued she was fired for a trivial reason as pretext to avoid paying the bonus. SCOV says this wasn’t sufficiently proven. There’s also quite a bit of analysis on at-will employment and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but in the interest of keeping this “summary” I’ll encourage you to go read it.
Plaintiff also made a wage claim that SCOV, which was also included with the bonus-related claims, and SCOV affirms that.
Last, SCOV tackled the defendant’s claim for attorney fees. The contract said in the event of a dispute, the primarily prevailing party could be awarded attorney fees. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for fees. However, SCOV concluded the defendant could recover fees under the language of the contract, so this part is reversed and remanded.
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Last for me this week is State v. Chamberlin, 2026 VT 29. SCOV affirms multiple convictions for lewd or lascivious conduct with a child and aggravated sexual assault with a child. There are several different grounds on appeal, and – spoiler alert – they’re all affirmed.
First, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the incident specified in that count happened in Brattleboro. The evidence at trial was that the allegations happened in Brattleboro, Vernon, and in Greenfield, Massachusetts. The standard for a judgment of acquittal is whether there is no evidence to support a guilty verdict. Here, the evidence was that the incidents happened in various places, including Brattleboro, There was other circumstantial evidence to show the incident happened in Brattleboro. Because there some evidence, which is more than no evidence, that’s enough to get to the jury. SCOV affirms the denial of the judgment of acquittal.
There was also an issue of introducing some uncharged bad acts. The court basically opened the barn door and let all the bad act evidence in to the record. SCOV affirms, because this is subject to the abuse of discretion standard. SCOV analyzes this by first looking at whether the evidence is relevant and material, and then whether the admission of the same is more probative than it is prejudicial. You know, the good ol’ 404(b) words. With child sexual assault cases, courts are able to admit more contextual evidence, because otherwise a single act seems “incongruous and incredible.” The State wanted admission of evidence of similar uncharged conduct by the defendant (on the same victim) that happened in Greenfield, Massachusetts. Defendant, unsurprisingly, wanted this excluded. The court permitted admission of this, and SCOV said the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it. It showed a common scheme or plan. SCOV also said it had sufficient probative value for also explaining why it took the victim some time to disclose the abuse (more on this below).
Defendant also argues there should have been a limiting instruction about the Greenfield conduct. But SCOV points out he didn’t ask for it at the time, and jury instruction questions are reviewed for plain error. This didn’t rise to the level of plain error, so SCOV finds no error.
There was also an expert, who testified about why victims sometimes wait to disclose abuse. Defendant said she wasn’t qualified; the state and the court felt otherwise based on her background and qualifications. This testimony was allegedly to help the jury understand why the victim waited to disclose all the incidents. The concern with a witness like this is always that the expert is vouching for the victim’s credibility. SCOV found that wasn’t the case here.
Last, the defendant argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making arguments that looked like burden-shifting. SCOV rejects this because the defense attorney didn’t object at the time. The standard on review in that situation is plain error, which SCOV said this was not.
So, SCOV affirms.
Judge Thibault was a special guest star on the SCOV panel for this one and wrote a dissent, which Justice Waples joined. I do love a good dissent. This one is a pretty good dissent. He would have reversed the conviction for the count that wasn’t clear if it was in Brattleboro. He points out that the admission of all the Greenfield, Massachusetts information would necessarily have to have been used to show the defendant’s propensity to have committed offenses in Brattleboro and Vernon. While the Greenfield evidence was helpful to show why there was a delay in reporting, because it happened after the incidents in Vermont, it did not show context for the Vermont incidents. And without a limiting instruction tying it to a specific purpose it was – and I like this so much I’ll quote it, “no more than propensity evidence under a different name.” He also felt it was plain error for the court not to give a limiting instruction, and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Now, go outside!
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