The title is about me, lest there be any confusion. I was away the week before last, so we're catchin' up a bit here at SCOV Law HQ. I figure "I was out of town" sounds better than "I forgot," so we're going with that.
First up is our entry order from July 23, covering the difference between "strike" and "vacate," and why it matters if you're a lawyer under suspension trying to get your license back.
Longtime readers will recognize this prosecutor-as-defendant saga. We covered the first interim suspension in 2024, involving disciplinary counsel's access to medical records after the prosecutor's DUI arrest, and how that goes away with cooperation. Then there was a nolo to the DUI itself and a deferred sentence. SCOV suspended over the conviction in this one, with Justice Nolan dissenting and opinion that the "seriousness" here was built out of role-based outrage. In June, the prosecutor finished probation. Under the deferred-sentence statute, the trial court struck the adjudication of guilt and discharged her. She moves for automatic reinstatement, arguing that's the same as her conviction being "vacated."
The SCOV majority says no dice. Strike and vacate aren't synonyms, and the Legislature knows it. Vacating nullifies a conviction; striking is closer to expungement because it hides the record without saying the conviction was wrong. Motion denied.
Justice Nolan concurs but notes disciplinary counsel sat on this for two-plus years and only moved for an emergency suspension after the prosecutor had already finished her sentence. An "emergency" that waits two years isn't much of one. In re Vekos, 2026 VT 35
On to Friday, or yesterday, or August 7, 2026—whatever floats your boat.
Here's an interest rate that should make your eyebrows do something.
Mr. Huber loans Ms. Currie $185K for a hemp business. The deal is reminiscent of less-legitimate-business loans: to pay back double in six months. It's a 200% annual interest situation, secured by the property and harvest proceeds. Ms. Currie never repays, never signs the promised mortgage, and quietly deeds the property to a second LLC she controls, for nothing.
Unsurprisingly, Mr. Huber sues. Ms. Currie pleads usury among thirteen defenses. Mr. Huber moves for summary judgment. Ms. Currie (now pro se) opposes but never develops her usury argument— just points to her answer. The trial court grants partial summary judgment. Two days before trial, new counsel tries to reopen the usury defense. Trial court says no, calls it waived, enters judgment at the statutory 12% (instead of the contract's 200%), and tacks on an equitable lien. It also never rules on Currie's third-party claims against the guys she blames for leaving her unable to pay Huber—despite telling everyone at trial it would.
SCOV affirms nearly everything. Pleading a defense is easy but surviving summary judgment isn't. You need facts, not a wave at your answer. Facially usurious doesn't mean automatically void, either. Usury is an affirmative defense, and unpreserved, the court can just sever the illegal excess and enforce the rest at the legal rate exactly like what happened here. Unclean hands goes down with it, since it was dependent on the usury claim that wasn't properly raised (or preserved).
Ms. Currie does get a small win though. Those third-party claims are still unresolved, and SCOV remands for the trial court to rule on them.
So, the judgment for Mr. Huber gets affirmed with the interest cut from 200% to 12%. The lien stands. But the third-party claims will get a ruling. Huber v. Currie, 2026 VT 36.
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