Swabs and Squabbles (or Friday the 13th Part Deaux)

When both parties ask for attorney's fees
By Andy Delaney

Five published opinions this week. Writing assignments here at SCOV Law HQ follow a rigorous, multi-tiered allocation protocol: a formal proposal identifying subject-matter distribution, followed by a deliberative review period and a final ratification phase. 

What does that mean? On Friday, Kruska texted "5 scov opinions today. If you want I could do the 3 criminal cases if you could do the other 2." I replied "sure." The deliberative review period lasted four-point-five seconds. So Kruska covered the criminal cases, and I have the other two. Let's get to it. 

We'll start with a juvenile case that turns on a rule-interpretation question.

The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that C.L., who was twelve at the time, committed aggravated sexual assault. The Vermont State Police then applied for a nontestimonial identification order (NTO) under Criminal Rule 41.1 to get a cheek swab for DNA. The family division issued the order, and C.L. moved to quash. His argument was a textual one: Rule 41.1 requires probable cause that an "offense" was committed, and the rule defines "offense" as one triable in any court and punishable by more than a year in prison. A delinquency adjudication isn't a conviction and doesn't carry prison time, so—the argument went—no "offense," no NTO.

The family division didn't buy it. It reasoned that the definition asks whether the offense is triable and punishable, not whether this particular kid will actually be tried and locked up. It also pointed to subsection (n), which expressly applies to juveniles who are (or may be) charged as delinquent. And it noted the practical problem: if NTOs weren't available in juvenile court, prosecutors might just file more cases in the criminal division when DNA matters. The family division granted permission for an interlocutory appeal.

SCOV affirms. The plain language covers it. The definition requires that the offense—not the offender—be triable and punishable, and C.L. doesn't argue that aggravated sexual assault fails that test. Rule 41.1(n) specifically covers kids in delinquency proceedings, and Family Rule 1 says Rule 41.1 applies to all delinquency proceedings. Reading the rule C.L.'s way would make both of those provisions pointless, and SCOV bravely presumes the drafters didn't write surplusage. On policy, SCOV agrees with the family division that shutting off NTOs in juvenile court would push more kids into the criminal division, which is the opposite of what the juvenile statutes are trying to do.

One footnote worth flagging: amendments to Rule 41.1 take effect January 1, 2027. For anyone under nineteen, "offense" will mean one punishable by more than two years. SCOV says its holding is consistent with the amendments but doesn't depend on them. In re C.L., 2026 VT 51.

Our next case is a construction dispute that started with a pond in Royalton back in 2017. Yes, 2017. Some ponds take longer than others.

Plaintiff sold land to defendant Goode and then contracted to build Goode a pond on another property. Plaintiff subcontracted with defendant Locke to clear-cut the site and also hired Locke to cut timber on plaintiff's own land. Things went sideways. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract, conversion, and IIED, and later added a Prompt Pay Act claim. Goode counterclaimed for consumer fraud and assault, among other things. Locke counterclaimed for breach of contract and extortion, alleging plaintiff threatened to make false reports to the police and Locke's parole officer to squeeze money and property out of him.

The jury awarded plaintiff $7,500 (plus about $8,150 in prejudgment interest) on his contract claim against Goode. It awarded Goode $5,000 on the assault claim and Locke $15,100 on the extortion claim. Both plaintiff and Goode then moved for attorney's fees under the PPA, each claiming to be the substantially prevailing party. The trial court denied both motions. It netted out all the verdicts, found defendants came out about $4,450 ahead, and concluded that nobody got what they wanted and nobody got an outcome worth the time and money spent. Seems reasonably fair.

SCOV affirms across the board, with a correction.

First, Goode argued that plaintiff abandoned his PPA claim by not putting it on the verdict form. SCOV explains that there's no PPA "claim" for a jury to decide in the first place—penalties and fees under the PPA are for the court or arbitrator, layered on top of the underlying contract judgment. Second, Goode argued that the jury's finding that he withheld payment in good faith made him the substantially prevailing party. Not necessarily. The statute contemplates at most one substantially prevailing party, not that there must be one, and the trial court properly looked at who achieved a comparative victory.

Plaintiff gets a partial win on paper. SCOV agrees the trial court shouldn't have counted Goode's assault award—it didn't share a common core of facts with the pond dispute—or Locke's extortion award, since Locke wasn't a party to the PPA claim. But the error is harmless because the trial court didn't rely solely on the net-judgment math; it also weighed what each side actually sought against what it got. And plaintiff's "I won $7,500 and Goode got zero on consumer fraud" argument doesn't compel a different answer either. Substantially prevailing isn't exactly a scoreboard.

That leaves the extortion verdict. Plaintiff argued that Vermont doesn't recognize a civil claim for extortion. The trial court went way back and relied on Hoyt v. Dewey, an 1878 case allowing recovery of money paid under the threat of a false criminal complaint, and framed the claim as economic duress (I can't find a public link to the case, so here are the cites if you really want to read it: 50 Vt. 465, 1878 WL 7393). SCOV agrees with the trial court's reading of Hoyt and notes that the jury instruction limited damages to the value of the money or property plaintiff received—which is essentially restitution. Plaintiff complained that $15,100 bore no relation to the $2,200 shipping container Locke allegedly asked for. Two problems: he didn't file a Rule 59 motion raising excessiveness, and he didn't order the transcript for the first day of trial, where the relevant testimony came in. No preservation, no transcript, no review. And so SCOV doesn't have to decide whether Vermont recognizes a freestanding civil extortion tort. That particular question lives to fight another day. Lamson v. Goode, 2026 VT 52.

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