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| We could probably use this for every post |
SCOV issued one opinion on Friday and two entry orders on Thursday this week. We'll start off with the opinion.
Our opinion deals with this question: Does the 2012 Telework Policy—which gives the "Appointing Authority" "sole discretion" to approve or terminate telework "with or without cause"—let the Guv'nor hi'self impose a blanket three-day-in-office standard, or does that power belong only to individual agency and department heads? (I've been watching British shows lately, so don't be surprised by a little UK flavor sneaking in—in fact, in my head, this whole thing is being narrated in a Cockney accent).
The Labor Relations Board read "Appointing Authority" narrowly, noted the Guv'nor isn't named in the policy, and concluded the Hybrid Work Standard was an unbargained change requiring negotiation.
The State appeals and SCOV reverses. Reviewing the contract interpretation point de novo rather than deferring to Board expertise (because this is contract law after all, not labor-relations know-how), SCOV points out that the policy also uses the word "employer," which SELRA defines as the State acting through the Guv'nor. Reading "Appointing Authority" to exclude the Guv'nor while including his subordinates produces subordinates with more power than the boss, which SCOV deems "improbable."
On the merits, the bigger point is that the Telework Policy never promised anyone a set number of remote days—it's discretionary and terminable without cause. A three-day floor with a compelling-reasons exception doesn't conflict with a policy that guaranteed nada to begin with. The Board's requirement that the State justify its "operational needs" also gets rejected; that language is in the eligibility clause, not the termination clause. SCOV declines to read a burden of proof into a provision that doesn't have one.
This one gets reversed and remanded, innit. Vt. State Emps.' Ass'n v. State, 2026 VT 43.
On to the entry orders.
Regular readers know this one by now. It started in March 2024 with respondent—the Addison County State's Attorney—catching an interim suspension over her refusal to cooperate with Disciplinary Counsel's inquiry into her medical leave—we covered that one here. That suspension got dissolved two months later once she cooperated. Then there was the no-contest plea to DUI itself, and in April of this year, SCOV suspended her again, classifying the conviction as a "serious crime," with Justice Nolan dissenting. In July, respondent tried to get reinstated on the theory that having her adjudication of guilt struck was the same as having her conviction vacated—but SCOV said no, "strike" and "vacate" aren't synonyms, though Justice Nolan flagged the point that Disciplinary Counsel had taken two years to move on an "emergency."
Round three. Respondent's deferred sentence has run its course, and her record was expunged under subsection (e) of this statute. She now argues expungement is broader than mere "striking" and gets her the automatic reinstatement July's decision denied her.
SCOV isn't convinced. The majority reasons expungement isn't "reversal or vacatur" either, and "da rules are da rules and the facts are the facts" and there's no expungement carve out. (If you have a dog and that little clip doesn't make you laugh, you probably shouldn't be reading this blog, but I digress).
Respondent's fallback argument is "extraordinary circumstances" under subsection (D)(2) of this rule, pointing to her last remaining deputy leaving the office in August and Addison County running without an in-house prosecutor. The AG's office has stepped in to cover it, however, and the Court treats that stopgap as fatal to the "extraordinary circumstances" showing the rule requires.
Justice Nolan dissents again, and this time it's the sharpest entry in the series: thirty-two months post-offense, full compliance, no recidivism, a record that legally no longer exists, and a county office running on borrowed prosecutors—that, Justice Nolan opines, is exactly the fact pattern "extraordinary circumstances" was written for.
The motion gets denied. In re Vekos, 2026 VT 45 (mem.)
Finally, we have a bail appeal, which means narrow review with an "extremely broad" trial-court-discretion standard that means SCOV is unlikely to do anything but affirm. Spoiler alert . . . .
Defendant is charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child under sixteen, a life offense, along with related counts. After a two-day weight-of-the-evidence hearing, the trial court held him without bail. He doesn't challenge the weight-of-the-evidence finding, so the presumption against release applies and the burden is his to overcome.
So, what he challenges is the trial court's refusal to release him to home detention under his wife's supervision. SCOV will not reweigh the evidence, because that's not its job. The trial court considered the applicable factors and wasn't "fully convinced" defendant would abide by release conditions—citing his mental state, his associations, his continued attempts to reach his step-granddaughter, and concerns about his wife as custodian. The Court reiterates that a trial court need not tie each factor individually to flight risk or public safety; the totality suffices.
One footnote for the record: the State asked SCOV to take judicial notice of post-appeal events, and SCOV declined, deciding the case on the record as it stood at the time of appeal.
This one gets affirmed. State v. Demore, 2026 VT 46.
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