Saturday, August 12, 2017

Things You Can Do In Half An Hour

In re: D.H. and S.C., Juveniles


Run a 5k. Bake a couple batches of chocolate chip cookies. Drive from Montpelier to Stowe. Watch a rerun of The Golden Girls on some random cable channel (we’ve all done it).

What could have happened in this case, but did not – which prompted a reversal – was to wait half an hour for a Mom to show up for court. SCOV says the fact the trial court did not grant a 30-minute continuance in a termination of parental rights hearing was reversible error.

For readers who don’t go to juvenile court, let me tell you how it goes. It is long. It takes forever. The cases never really go away. And there are far, far too many of them. Some parents really get it together and work hard and try to have their families together. Some parents find that the procedure is a punishment, and fade away as the case progresses.

Saturday, July 29, 2017

Harmony

State v. Joseph2017 VT 52

By Elizabeth Kruska

Mr. Joseph owns some land in Bennington County. He had some trees he wanted to cut down. Unfortunately, he strayed onto his neighbor’s land and cut down three of his neighbor’s trees.
He is all pine, and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He was charged with a type of trespass that forbade entering property and taking something of value which is parcel of the realty. Trees fit that description. While Mr. Joseph’s trial was pending, the legislature passed a timber trespass law that seemed to conflict with the existing law.

Sunday, July 23, 2017

You Can Bite This Apple Twice

"See that? Looks like a clerical error."
McLaughlin v. Pallito, 2017 VT 30

By Andrew Delaney

Most of the time, you only get one bite at the proverbial apple. I’ve always wondered about that phrase. Who doesn’t take more than one bite of an apple? I consulted the Google and the results are inconclusive—several folks think it’s a biblical Garden of Eden reference, a few think it’s a Snow White thing, and then there are some weird sexual theories out there. (Because aren’t there always?) This has nothing to do with this case. But I’ll be damned if I’m going to be the only one wasting time on this phrase.

The issue is this case is whether a prison superintendent can order a second hearing on a rule violation when the first hearing panel gives a not guilty based on a clerical error. SCOV says the second hearing is okay, which instinctively seems a bit strange, so let’s dig into it.

Mr. McLaughlin is a guest at state-subsidized housing—the kind very few people willingly live in. He got hit with a DOC charge—commonly referred to as a “D.R.”—for fighting. As is required in such cases, the prison held a hearing.

Friday, July 14, 2017

Bites at the Apple

That's it! No more biting! 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Watts, 2017 VT 57

By Elizabeth Kruska

How many bites at the apple are authorized? One.

Sort of related. I’m currently surrounded by Apple Products. I’m like that guy in the old commercials: I’m a Mac. But I just noticed that the ubiquitous Apple logo has one bite taken out of it, and now I wonder why. I wonder if it’s simply because it’s good design, or if it’s something larger. Maybe it means you only get one bite at the apple, so make it count. I don’t know. Maybe that’s a little too deep for right now.

Anyway, the Wattses—Paris and Skip—had some property and executed a mortgage back in 2006, and the note ultimately ended up with Detusche Bank, who we’ll just call “Lender.” The Wattses, or the “Borrowers” didn’t make their mortgage payment that was due on December 1, 2008. The Lender wasn’t hip to this action and filed a complaint in the appropriate Vermont Superior Court seeking foreclosure and all sorts of associated fees. In February of 2010, Lender filed an affidavit with the court indicating that service was complete.

Then for a very long time, just like in Vermont itself, nothing happened.

Sunday, July 9, 2017

Show Your Work

"And then the calculator said . . ."
Stevens Law Office v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Co., 2017 VT 61

By Andrew Delaney

When I was younger, I was quite good at math. The thing I never liked was having to show my work. If I got the right answer, what did it matter? Then, when I was headed to law school, I was told something like, “Now, it doesn’t matter if you get the right answer—the right answer is largely irrelevant. The important thing is to show your analysis.” I thought that seemed doubly silly. Now that I teach college classes, I think I know why: answers are boring but analysis can be entertaining. I’m kidding . . . sort of. The bottom line is that in law—like in math class—it’s important to show your work.

Here’s the story. Mr. Larock hired Stevens Law Office to represent him in a case. Stevens Law Office required a $16K nonrefundable retainer. Mr. Larock has a structured settlement, and the way the $16K would get paid is in 2022, the settlement funding company would pay the $16K directly to Stevens Law Office. Mr. Larock agreed to these terms.

Stevens Law Office then asked the trial court to approve the deal as required by this statute. There was a brief hearing, and an inquiry with bar counsel about the propriety of nonrefundable retainers (they’re okay as long as there’s notice of nonrefundability, scope, and the fee is reasonable). The trial court then issued a decision, concluding that because Stevens Law Office’s representation was ongoing, any determination of whether the fee was reasonable would be necessarily speculative.

Saturday, July 8, 2017

Keeping Tabs on Mom

Unfortunately, the kind of GPS
featured in this summary does
not come with detailed maps 
State v. Kane, 2017 VT 36

By Eric Fanning

What we have here, folks, is a violation of probation (VOP) appeal. Probation is a court-imposed criminal sentence where the convicted offender is released into the community instead of going to jail. Virtually all probationers have to abide by certain conditions while serving their sentence. If the probationer violates those conditions or fails to regularly check in with their probation officer (PO), they get a complimentary extended stay at the Big House, courtesy of the State.

Defendant/appellant Patricia Kane plead guilty to custodial interference (she took her son from his legal custodian and crossed state lines). She was sentenced to two to five years, all suspended except for one year. After serving the unsuspended portion of her sentence in prison, she was released on probation. As a condition of her probation, Kane was required to stay 500 feet away from her son’s school and home, avoid contacting him without authorization from the court or the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and to obey all DCF orders. She was also required under Condition 32 to submit to electronic monitoring as directed by her PO.

Under Condition 32, the Department of Corrections (DOC) required Kane to wear a GPS unit. One of the components needs to be charged twice a day for two hours at a time or else it loses juice and the signal is lost. The details of the alleged VOP’s aren’t terribly important here, but basically, the State says Kane willfully disregarded Condition 32 by doing such a terrible job of keeping the GPS unit charged. Kane claims the charging station made her phone unusable, and that it made weird fax machine-like sounds, and so she had to unplug it to make phone calls. At her probation revocation hearing, State put on evidence that the unit was disconnected on multiple occasions for lengthy periods of time, and that this, along with the testimony of her corrections officers, was enough to conclude that she was willfully disrupting her GPS monitoring. The criminal division found that Kane did willfully violate her conditions of probation.

The All New Let’s Make A Deal

Weaver . . . get it?
Weaver v. Weaver, 2017 VT 58

By Elizabeth Kruska

My husband and I have a deal in our marriage. Whoever cooks dinner is absolved of cleanup duties. If I cook, he cleans up. If he cooks, I clean up. There was this fabulous time right after Hurricane Irene when our town didn’t have water. That was also the exact same day he decided to make a delicious chicken and vegetable stir fry, using—and I am not making this up—seven bowls, three pans, two cutting boards, and all the spoons. But because we didn’t have running water I couldn’t wash the dishes. I had to rinse off the dishes in the stream behind our house because if I didn’t they’d get funky in the sink, and because a deal is a deal. He cooked, I cleaned up. In the days following we ate a lot of PBJ’s until the town felt it was safe to turn the water back on. I’m not at all ashamed to admit that PBJ and PBR is a perfectly adequate dinner in August. (Do not confuse Pabst Blue Ribbon with the Professional Bull Riders Association. Both are PBR’s, both are great, but they are significantly different in terms of thirst quenching and contact with very large, horned animals.)

This deal is not a big deal. And in terms of marriage-related agreements, it’s fairly minor. A bigger, and very common agreement often has to do with raising children. It’s completely normal for one spouse to work while the other either works part time or stays home if a family has kids. There are loads of reasons for this, and all are completely valid.

The spouse who doesn’t stay home gets a significant benefit. Although it’s a one-income situation, it ensures that the kids are home and raised according to how the family wants to do that. It also potentially means that the spouse at home keeps the home in working order. It also means the working spouse has the benefit of continuity of career, which leads to advancement and higher rates of pay.

Sunday, June 25, 2017

Lesson Learned

And . . . done.
In re Pope, 2017 VT 55 (mem.)

By Andrew Delaney

I am not a fan of the way SCOV is publishing decisions these days. I’m not sure why SCOV is self-publishing like a struggling pulp fiction author, but when the Department of Libraries was in charge, at least there was some semblance of method to the madness. And now that there’s a new website, none of the old links work. Go ‘head, click a vermontjudiciary.org-associated link on any summary more than a few months old or any case link on the older summaries. Also, published entry orders like this one somehow end up in some black hole in Googletopia and not on the browse-by-date list. At any rate, this has nothing to do with the opinion, but if someone out there would like to really scour the vermontjudiciary.org site and make a comprehensive index so we can cross-reference it in connection with our mission to keep the public informed that’d be cool. Just shoot me an email.

We now return to our regularly scheduled programming.

In this decision, SCOV puts its seal of approval on the Professional Responsibility Board’s decision to reinstate Attorney Pope’s suspended law license. 

Saturday, June 24, 2017

Bifurcation

Bifurcated Avocado
State v. Bangoura, 2017 VT 53

By Elizabeth Kruska

This opinion is really short. In fact, it will probably take me longer to write about it than it does to read the actual opinion. So, go read the opinion, too.

Mr. Bangoura appealed his conviction for a second-offense DUI. SCOV affirms.

The issue here has to do with bifurcation of the trial. There are some crimes that someone can commit multiple times and the maximum possible punishment doesn’t change. For example, someone can commit petit larceny over and over by stealing multiple times, and the maximum possible penalty allowed by law doesn’t change. On the other hand, our criminal code has other crimes that are known as predicate offenses, and DUIs fall into this category. If someone gets charged with a first offense DUI, there’s a particular punishment available. If a person gets charged with a DUI when they already have a prior DUI conviction, the penalty steps up to a higher level.

Keep Doing What You’re Doing

Keep on keepin' on
North Country Sportsman’s Club v. Williston, 2017 VT 46

By Elizabeth Kruska

Long story short: the North Country Sportsman’s Club is allowed to keep doing what it’s been doing.

Here’s the longer version. The North Country Sportsman’s Club, which I’ll just call the Club, has been around for some fifty-odd years. There isn’t a super-clear description of the Club in the opinion, but I take it from the description that it’s a shooting range available for skeet shooting. People probably also do shooting practice there with targets and whatnot.

In 2004 the Town of Williston made an ordinance prohibiting certain levels of noise. However, the ordinance exempted certain noise, including sport shooting under certain permitted conditions. The ordinance also specifically called for an agreement to be made between the Town and the Club to outline when the Club could operate. The ordinance doesn’t mention this particular club by name, which makes me wonder if there are multiple shooting clubs or ranges operating in Williston, or if the Town just didn’t want to call out this particular club specifically in the ordinance. Not that it’s super relevant; it just made me wonder.

Sunday, June 18, 2017

Paperwork Problems

Ruh roh! Rat's rot ronrurrent!
Perron v. Menard, 2017 VT 50

By Andrew Delaney

This case has some moving parts that could be hazardous to small children. Let’s hope I get the story straight.

New York wants Mr. Perron to come do time in the Empire State on a grand larceny bid. Mr. Perron was “initially detained on a prerequisition warrant”—whatever that is—but then the Vermont Governor issued two different warrants for Mr. Perron’s arrest. Best I can figure, the trial court denied Mr. Perron’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and then denied his challenge to the governor’s warrants. How did we end up here?

Back in 2014, Mr. Perron was indicted in New York on a bunch of charges. Then he got hit with a federal wire fraud charge out of Florida. He was taken into New York custody and took a plea in New York on one count of grand larceny, for which he got a two-to-four-year bid. Mr. Perron was then shuffled off to the feds and convicted on the federal charge, racking up thirty months on the federal side. The sentencing documents didn’t say anything about whether it would be concurrent or consecutive to the New York sentence. As Scooby Doo might say, “Ruh roh. Rat’s rot rood.”

Sunday, June 4, 2017

Up On The Roof

LeClair v. LeClair, 2017 VT 34

By Elizabeth Kruska

This case reads a lot like a law school hypothetical. In fact, part of me wonders if there’s a Vermont Law School professor of torts out there reading this opinion thinking, “This is a mighty fine way to teach premises liability.”

The facts here are fairly simple. Plaintiff is the grandson of Defendant. Defendant is an experienced builder and Plaintiff is an experienced roofer. Defendant went to his own son, Plaintiff’s dad, and wanted to get some work done on the roof of his place of business. Plaintiff’s dad went to Plaintiff, who wasn’t working at the time, and let him know about a roofing job for Grandpa.

One day in October, Plaintiff and a friend of his went to Defendant’s building to work on the roof. They’d already started the job, and had taken off some of the shingles, leaving only the underlay material exposed. Being October, it was chilly and some frost had formed on the roof. Plaintiff didn’t want to go up on the roof, because the conditions made it slippery. Defendant told him to wet down the roof and get to work. Plaintiff did as he was instructed, and unfortunately, fell to the ground below, injuring his head and neck.

DCF Jumps the Gun

And, we're off to the races . . .
In re A.M., 2017 VT 5

By Amy Davis

As any parent can attest, once in awhile you make mistakes and aren’t a very good parent. This case focuses around whether one slip-up during a juvenile case is enough to make you lose your rights to your kids. It’s not, usually.

These two teenagers had some kids, and at the time of the proceedings, the kids were 8, 6 and 2 ½ years old. Babies having babies, man. At one point, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) got involved with the two older kids, but parents made progress and the case got dismissed.

Mom and Dad tended to fight a bit, would separate, then Dad would say, “you’ve been screwing around on me” so Mom would say, “well yeah but you hit me.” It went on like this for several years, but summer 2012 to summer 2014 seemed calmer. Mom was the one who cleaned and fed the kids, while Dad didn’t do much. Then in July 2014, Dad left and moved to New York about 90 minutes away with Mom. Kids stayed with Mom. Mom filed, and the court granted, a relief from abuse (RFA) order to her in September 2014. That order gave Dad regular visits with the kids. Dad also tried to modify the custody order in family court, but the State intervened with a CHINS petition, so his motion was never heard.

Sunday, May 21, 2017

Solar Flare

Get it? 
Russell v. Hernon, 2017 VT 45

By Andrew Delaney

The most-important lesson in this case is that the basis for a prejudgment-interest start date has to have a discernible basis.

Mr. Russell was involved in efforts to develop solar facilities and possibly sell solar tax credits. I keep getting calls from folks with interesting accents trying to get me to put solar panels on my house. I don’t believe these are related, but I do enjoy messing with people who call me up and try to sell me stuff. There is nothing more entertaining than exasperated telemarketers (email me for NSFW link to a conversation with “Microsoft”). Digression is a way of life here at SCOV Law.

Back to the story . . . so Mr. Russell, Mr. Hernon, and a couple business entities are involved in this solar-facilities-and-tax-credits project. According to Mr. Russell he was the concepts guy and the head admin person.

Sunday, May 14, 2017

Some Assembly Required

"Umm, I think we're missing a piece."
Airi v. Nagra, 2017 VT 42

By Andrew Delaney

The lesson from this appeal is that if you appeal a trial court judgment and don’t order transcripts, you’re gonna have a bad time.

Mr. Nagra appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Mr. Airi. Briefly, Mr. Airi agreed to do some hotel-management work for either Mr. Nagra or for Mr. Nagra’s companies. There were FBI raids and restructuring, a receivership, and some other twists and turns along the way. During that time, there were two periods during which Mr. Airi contracted to do stuff with the receivership, complete certain hotel management tasks, and to complete hotel financing projects—stuff Mr. Nagra couldn’t do because of pending criminal charges and other legal issues.

Mr. Airi never got paid. So he sued Mr. Nagra. Mr. Nagra didn’t show up for the court trial. The court took evidence and entered judgment against Mr. Nagra for just shy of thirty grand for the work Mr. Airi did.

Key Party

"Seriously, do not lose
this key: it's the only
one we've got."
State v. Giguere, 2017 VT 40

By Elizabeth Kruska

The Canaan, Vermont police department—in sparsely-populated Essex County—gets locked at night. To get in after hours, you have to locate the key. You don’t need to resort to extremes or anything, you just need to call the police chief.

This system works great except that sometimes the chief goes out of town. And from what I can gather from this opinion, if the chief is out of town, and he has the key, ain’t nobody getting in to the Canaan Police Department. This likely isn’t a big deal except for the fact that in this sparsely-populated part of Vermont, there aren’t a lot of police departments, which means there aren’t a lot of breath-testing machines in the area that can be used during a DUI processing.

Let’s be fair. I have never been to Canaan, Vermont. I’d like to go there sometime. In fact, I’d like to visit all the towns in Vermont. We even have a club for people who do that. The thing about Canaan is that it is far away. You may think there are places close to Canaan. Yes. It is close to Canada. In fact, it touches Canada. Canaan, in fact, not only touches Canada, but it is somehow partly oddly north of New Hampshire. It’s the town way up in the northeast corner that curls over and sort of wraps around New Hampshire a little bit. It’s all the fun of being in New Hampshire, except you still have to pay sales tax and it’s not New Hampshire.

The Art of Business and Insurance Policy Coverage

'Business' as Usual? 
Shriner v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 2017 VT 23

By Thomas M. Kester

“Choose a job you love, and you will never have to work a day in your life.” This sentiment also  applies to part-time jobs—and maybe, by extension, to your insurance policy exclusions.

Plaintiff, a retired physician, is a glassblower who moved his equipment onto his residence, specifically, his garage. Plaintiff blew glass with a friend and the two operated a glassblowing enterprise. Plaintiff identified himself as a “artisan” on his tax forms and filed a Schedule C form for business profits with the Internal Revenue Service, describing his business type as “blown glass manufacturing.”

On January 12, 2012, “The furnace exhaust system in a piece of glassmaking equipment malfunctioned and caused a fire that destroyed the garage and all the property and equipment inside it.” Plaintiff was covered by a homeowner’s policy issued by Defendant. “The policy carried a $25,000 deductible and contained an exclusion from coverage for structures from which a business was conducted.” I smell trouble brewing. Plaintiff claimed $88,354.91 in personal property lost. Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s claim and calculated replacement cots at $42,422.97. After applying the policy’s deductible, Defendant made an advance cash payment of $1,460.53.

Thursday, May 11, 2017

Language Wrangling

This is not the same Carter.
State v. Carter


Lawyers learn very early in their careers that words need to mean what they are supposed to mean, and if there’s ambiguity everything stops. Legal writing tends to be short and to the point. Sentences are subject-verb, and that’s about it. That way the writer and the reader know what the words mean.

There can be a bit of a collision when a statute isn’t written clearly, and it can lead later to some legal word wrangling. The folks under the golden dome say, “hey, we need a law about [insert topic here] and this is what we want it to do.” They write something and they have their legislative counsel look at it and as the sausage gets made, things get added or taken out, and eventually they get to a statute that seems to achieve the goal. This can be a problem when the new statute doesn’t seem to square with another one that already exists.

Damned If You Do, Damned If You Did

You get TWO opinions in one post! That's some deal we're
offering here at the SCOVLawBlog. Just pay separate
shipping and handling.
State v. Rondeau


This case feels like a long and winding road (sorry, Beatles), so stay with me.

Defendant Michael Rondeau was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault following a jury trial.  The victim in this case is his daughter.  Count One of the State’s information (an information contains the charges which the prosecutor submits to the court – this gets the prosecutorial ball rolling) alleged that he committed aggravated sexual assault in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8) at some time between October 1989 and October 11, 1997, when the complainant was under thirteen years old and defendant was at least eighteen years old.  This charge carries a potential sentence of ten years to life.  Count Two alleged that he committed aggravated sexual assault of a child as part of a common scheme in violation of 13 V.S.A. §3253a(a)(8), during the period between October 12, 1997 and October 11, 2000, when complainant was under sixteen and defendant was at least eighteen.  This charge carried a harsher sentence: twenty-five to life.  Needless to say, Rondeau was facing some hard time.

Monday, May 1, 2017

Wave That Waiver

Wave (waive?) it wide, and high.
In re: Jankowski


Let’s stroll through how a criminal case proceeds. Normally criminal cases start with an allegation, which must be proven by the State. If the defendant is convicted, then he or she gets sentenced. If there’s a sentence that involves probation, there will be probation conditions or requirements. If the defendant then violates one or more terms of probation, we sort of start over again with having a hearing where the State has to prove the merits of the violation allegation. If the State proves the violation the case goes to sentencing. If something goes legally wrong relative to legal issues within the merits or sentencing hearing, normally the defendant is allowed to appeal. If something goes wrong collaterally to the proceeding, the defendant can file for post-conviction relief (PCR). If the PCR is granted, the case jumps back to the stage of the case where things went sideways.

In this case, Mr. Jankowski filed a PCR based on things that happened during a probation violation. In 2010, he pled guilty to a sexual assault charge and was sentenced to 5-20 years, split with 3 years to serve. That means he’d serve 3 years in jail and then be released on probation. If he were to violate his probation and have his probation revoked, his full sentence of 5-20 years could be imposed. Under normal circumstances he’d be eligible for release at his minimum, or, the 5 year mark, but would be on supervision for the balance of time between 5 and 20 years.

Tuesday, April 25, 2017

Estoppel Denied


State v. Nutbrown-Covey


If you went to law school, you likely remember that hazy, confusing time during the first semester when nothing makes sense and when it feels like you’re trying to study and learn a new language all at once. This is around the time first year students learn about claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Your brain probably fogged over and you thought, "wha?" Luckily, it's one of those things that in practice makes perfect sense. 

This is an issue preclusion case. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is part of the legal doctrine that allows a party to litigate a matter once. This generally pops up in civil cases, but sometimes there’s cross-over into criminal cases, as you’ll see here. The point is that a party doesn’t get to keep litigating the same thing over and over if generally all the moving pieces to the matter are the same.

Sunday, April 23, 2017

Silence is . . . Problematic

To speak or not to speak? Now that
is the question . . .
State v. Ladue, 2017 VT 20

By Andrew Delaney

First, the story. Once upon a time, or more specifically, at around 11:00 p.m. in Burlington on January 27, 2014, a woman heard a crash outside of her house. She then saw a late-90s silver-colored Honda with a loud exhaust backing away from a Subaru. The police were summoned. 

Mr. Officer showed up and chatted with Ms. Witness. Mr. Officer went looking for the Honda, was not successful in his efforts, and so returned to the scene of the crime. Lo and behold, a silver Honda was parked nearby. So Mr. Officer talked to Ms. Witness and she said, “That’s the car, officer!”

So, Mr. Officer ran the plates, identified Mr. Ladue as the registered owner, and moseyed over to Mr. Ladue’s house. Mr. Ladue was not home, but his mom was. As Mr. Officer was getting into his patrol car, however, Mr. Ladue pulled into the driveway driving the silver Honda. So Mr. Officer stopped his egress and walked up the driveway and confronted Mr. Ladue. The first question Mr. Officer asked him was whether anyone else had driven the car that night. Mr. Ladue allegedly said, “No.” Mr. Officer didn’t see any visible damage to the vehicle.

Friday, April 21, 2017

The Debt That Doesn't Die

H&E Equipment Services, Inc. v. Cassani, 2017 VT 17

By Andrew Delaney

I know a thing or thirty about debt following one around. Thanks to law school, I’ll be paying on loans until I die. There’s no sense in filing bankruptcy because student loans generally don’t go away even then. I’m not complaining. But debt can be a bit of a pain in the you-know-what. I’m not a fan. I’m guessing Mr. Cassani also is not a fan.

H&E Equipment Services, Inc. (H&E) got a judgment against Mr. Cassani in Arizona in 2001, and renewed the judgment twice in Arizona. In early 2015, H&E filed a complaint in Vermont to collect the judgment—a little over $56K plus interest—and attached a 2011 “judgment renewal affidavit” from Arizona.

Mr. Cassani moved to dismiss the complaint under this statute, which gives one eight years to collect on a judgment in Vermont or else it’s game over. Mr. Cassani apparently argued that the original 2001 date was the controlling date rather than the 2011 renewal. The trial court said, “Nice try, but no cigar.” Mr. Cassani moved for reconsideration. Still no cigar.

Broad Questions

In re Atwood, 2017 VT 16

By Elizabeth Kruska

I am a sports fan. I like some sports better than others, of course, but I think I can safely say I generally “like sports.” I don’t especially like the post-game interview, though. You know, the one where someone who works for a television network goes over to the winning coach or player, and asks completely ridiculous, unanswerable questions. They’re always along the lines of, “how special is it for you that you’ve won the Big Game?” As if the player or coach is going to say, “meh, this wasn’t that big a deal.” Instead, the answer is always a Grandpa Simpson-style rambling non-answer like, “I just want to give a shout out to my teammates about how we overcame adversity and stuck together to win this game.” That is not an answer to the question, and quite frankly, doesn’t answer any question anyone asked ever.

That’s maybe a little bit like what happened in this case. Atwood Enterprises, Inc. (Atwood) acquired 28 acres of land in Jericho where they planned to build a housing planned unit development (PUD). In order to do this, of course, Atwood needed to get a permit from the local board, and before they did that they had to provide appropriate notice to the surrounding landowners. The neighbors learned about the permit and showed up at the meeting to voice concerns and objections. The local Development Review Board took the neighbors’ concerns into consideration and ultimately gave the green light to Atwood to start the building.

Neighbors (there are several, and it’s easier to call them “Neighbors”) appealed the DRB’s finding to the Environmental Division. When an opposing party appeals to the Environmental Division, the party has to sent a Statement of Questions and this creates the framework for any future evidentiary hearing. Neighbors asked an incredibly broad question. “Does the six-unit, three-duplex PUD subdivision on a 28.5 acre portion of an approximate 123 acre parcel of land owned by Atwood Enterprises, Inc. satisfy the requirements of the Jericho Land Use and Development Regulations?”

Thursday, April 20, 2017

Remand for Sentencing


State v. Sullivan, 2017 VT 24


I want to make sure this is really clear: this case involves a remand for sentencing. That means his sentencing hearing is supposed to happen again. Not that he’s not getting a sentence, not that he’s “getting off for free,” not that he’s getting his conviction overturned. It’s that he’s getting another sentencing hearing.

I point this out, because by the time I’m writing this summary, I’ve seen the news articles about the SCOV decision in our local media. I also read the comments people posted in reaction to the story. Some people are really upset that he gets a new sentencing hearing, and perhaps misunderstand that the court’s decision doesn’t change the defendant’s guilt or innocence in the matter. This is because either a) they didn’t actually read the news story indicating that there’s a new sentencing hearing or b) the news story somehow made it seem like someone got away with something.

Sunday, April 16, 2017

Justice Delayed?

State v. King, 2016 VT 131

By Andrew Delaney

Does a three-year-plus delay in bringing charges after an investigation concludes violate due process under the U.S. or Vermont Constitutions? As always, it depends, but the short answer is no.

Back in ’08, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) started a sexual assault investigation, which DCF sent over to a detective. The detective interviewed the complainant, sent the case to the State’s Attorney’s office, and interviewed a couple more witnesses. From what I can gather, the complainant and her friend (one of the witnesses) were teenagers in 2008-09 and the alleged acts occurred in the early 2000s. And then the case kinda sat around from 2009 until 2012.

In the meantime, DCF sent a substantiation letter to Mr. King. Though Mr. King never appealed the substantiation, he did ask for it to be expunged. The DCF Commissioner denied the request.

Saturday, April 15, 2017

Responsibility

In re PRB No. 2013-145, 2017VT 8

By Elizabeth Kruska

Let me sum up (or tl;dr, in the parlance of our times), attorneys have to keep their client trust accounts up-to-date, accurate, reconciled, and accurate. Did I mention accurate?

As a lawyer, I know that one thing we lawyer-types like to joke about is how we don’t like numbers. I used to have lots of cases with a particular former prosecutor who would frequently say things like, “I’m a lawyer! I don’t know anything about counting!” This is someone who is a good lawyer, who I like very much, and yes, who was no good at counting. Numbers are no joking matter, though, when it comes to other people’s money. And by people, I am referring to a specific group of people: clients.

I know we have a pretty varied audience, including lawyers and non-lawyers alike. For non-lawyers, and for readers who haven’t experienced how hourly legal fees generally work, I’ll be glad to explain. Suppose Client hires Lawyer to represent him in a case and Lawyer will charge an hourly fee. Lawyer gets a retainer from Client and bills hourly against the retainer. The retainer is always Client’s money, and Lawyer has to earn the money by doing the work. If the case is finished before the retainer runs out, Lawyer gives back to Client what’s left. In the meantime, though, the retainer sits in Lawyer’s client trust account. This is also sometimes referred to as an IOLTA (interest on lawyers’ trust accounts) account. Any interest that gets generated by the money in the account doesn’t belong to either the client or the lawyer; the bank collects it and distributes the interest to the Vermont Bar Foundation, which uses that money for funding various low-income legal assistance projects.

Saturday, April 8, 2017

Will be Conditional or Not

In re Holbrook, 2017 VT 15

By Thomas M. Kester

Tom Sawyer watched his own funeral. 

But Dr. Alfred Nobel most likely read his own obituary in April 1888. How was that possible? Alfred’s brother, Ludvig, died in Cannes, France in April 1888 and the French newspapers mistakenly thought the deceased “Nobel” to be the more famous one (talk about fake news). This journalistic specter of death is bad on its own, but the French newspapers’ headlines would have stopped Alfred Noble cold in his tracks. 

One in particular proclaimed: Le marchand de la mort est mort (“The merchant of death is dead”). For those who don’t know, Alfred Nobel was the inventor of dynamite. Alfred thought himself a great inventor, as he believed his invention was for betterment of humankind—like to move earth for monumental construction projects such as the Panama Canal. The mistaken obituary may have led Alfred Nobel to rethink his life’s work and its lasting impression on the world. He changed his will sometime after April 1888 and, upon his real death on December 10, 1896, his fortune funded and ultimately created the Nobel prizes. Scholars on this subject don’t know for sure if reading his own obituary and the dissonance between its macabre reflection and his own personal views caused Alfred Nobel to use his will to create the Nobel prizes—a symbol of having accomplished extraordinary and noble acts in one’s life. 

Prison Presumed

State v. Henault, 2017 VT 17 (mem.)

By Andrew Delaney

Mr. Henault was held without bail. He appeals.

He’s charged with four counts, including a sexual assault charge that carries a potential life sentence. 

There’s a general presumption that bail will be granted. But when a crime carries a potential life sentence and the State can show “great” (I’ve griped about this terminology before) evidence of guilt, that presumption gets flipped on its head, and the presumption is that the defendant will be held without bail. The trial court has discretion, however, to impose conditions of release and allow bail. In making that determination, the trial court can look at the nine factors listed in subsection b of this statute, though it’s not required to. This is because the statute, by its terms, applies only when there’s a constitutional right to bail.

Use it or lose it

Pratt v. Pallito, 2017 VT 22

By Andrew Delaney

In appellate procedure, an issue not raised below becomes the proverbial snowball in hell. This is a constant. There’s the rare exception for clear error and manifest injustice, but for the most part, the phrase “an issue raised for the first time on appeal” is the death knell for an appellate argument. I think of Rule 75 petitions as (more or less) appeals of administrative proceedings.

This case deals with whether a petitioner can challenge a Department of Corrections’ (DOC) disciplinary conviction in the trial court on grounds not preserved in the DOC proceedings. The SCOV says “Nope.”

Disciplinary convictions in the DOC system follow a step-by-step path. When an inmate is charged with violating a rule, a hearing officer holds a hearing on the alleged rule violation. If the violation is upheld, a report is submitted to the Disciplinary Committee, which reviews the hearing officer’s decision. Then it goes to the Superintendent for review. Then the decision goes to the inmate. The inmate has a week to appeal. The Superintendent has to specifically address all appeal issues raised by the inmate in the appeal. After that, an inmate can challenge the conviction in the superior court, civil division with a Rule 75 petition.

Probation Conditions . . . Again

State v. Albarelli, 2016 VT 119

By Elizabeth Kruska

I know what you’re thinking. You’re thinking it’s been a little while since there was a case about probation conditions from the Vermont Supreme Court. That’s a little inside joke around here, because there have been something like eleventy-jillion cases about probation conditions in the last couple years. Here’s another one. Well, there are two parts to this case, and one of them involves probation conditions.

Backing up. Cameron Albarelli got charged with simple assault, disorderly conduct, and providing false information to a law enforcement officer. The facts alleged were that he was with a group of guys bar hopping on Church Street in Burlington one night. They were celebrating an upcoming wedding, which was the following day. Albarelli had a lot to drink. At one point, his group confronted a man sitting on a bench. Another group of people saw this confrontation and tried to intervene. That led to Albarelli and a person in the second group getting into a fight. It ended and Albarelli ran down the street. Someone called the police, and they were able to identify Albarelli by his clothing.

Albarelli initially told the police his name was “Cameron Mitchell” and gave a date of birth that was 1 year off his actual date of birth. His full name is Cameron Mitchell Albarelli. He didn’t exactly admit that he was in a fight, but alluded to the fact that he ran away to get away from the confrontation. He had a trial in his case and was convicted on all three counts. He got a sentence that included probation and work crew.

Sunday, April 2, 2017

Nope, nope, nope

State v. Richard, 2016 VT 75

By Andrew Delaney

Mr. Richard wasn’t interested in being pulled over. He ran a stop sign, so a trooper started following him. Mr. Richard was allegedly driving erratically. When the trooper turned on the blue lights, Mr. Richard kept going until he reached his driveway. He got out and started walking up the ramp to his house. The trooper stopped him.

The trooper testified that Mr. Richard smelled like booze and seemed out of it. Mr. Richard repeatedly said “don’t do this,” and when the trooper said, “C’mon let’s go,” Mr. Richard said, “Nope, nope, nope.” Now it’s been a little while since my drinking days and I don’t want to sound like I’m on the trooper’s side here, but “nope, nope, nope” is—in my, uh, training and experience—classic Drunkanese for “no, thank you, sir.”

The trooper thought so too, and cuffed Mr. Richard and gave him a ride to the police station. To be fair, Mr. Richard was already home, so I can understand why from his perspective this was a nope-nope-nope situation. There was an exchange after the breath test at the station about a trip to the hospital for an independent blood test but Mr. Richard didn’t have the supposedly required seventy-five bucks. So Mr. Richard said, “Well, I don't have seventy-five bucks, so.” My wife hates when I talk like that. I can always expect a, “So, what?” The trooper apparently did not have my wife’s pet peeve so that was the end of the conversation.

Sunday, March 26, 2017

Double Jeopardy Dilemma

State v. Dow, 2016 VT 91

By Andrew Delaney

Mr. Dow was charged with a smorgasbord of crimes after a fight with his wife and a later conflict with police. There was a partial mistrial, a couple convictions, a subsequent motion to dismiss, and a direct and interlocutory appeal—it all seems a bit messy to yours truly.

Let’s see if we can’t sort it out, huh?

Back in 2014, Mr. Dow’s wife posted a “revealing photograph” of herself on the interwebs. Mr. Dow became angry and this led to yelling and knocking items off of shelves. Mrs. Dow called the police and the police showed up. Mr. Dow was in a bedroom down the hall. The police officers asked him to come out and talk. Mr. Dow said, “No!” and told the officers to get out of his house.

No Cigar

State v. Haskins, 2016 VT 79

By Charlie Buttrey

Perhaps the only thing worse than losing in front of the Vermont Supreme Court, particularly after it agrees with you that the trial judge made a mistake, is losing by a split decision.

Glen Haskins knows the feeling.

Haskins was convicted of attempted murder, following a wild brawl in downtown Burlington at 2:00 a.m. on a cold January night in 2012 during which the victim was stabbed in the stomach. (Fun aside: On Youtube, there are at least three different songs with the lyric “Nothing good happens after 2 a.m.”).

Be There Or Be Square

State v. Grace, 2016 VT 113

By Elizabeth Kruska

Woody Allen is credited with saying that 80% of life is showing up. That’s largely true of criminal court, as well. There’s a whole lot of showing up involved in court cases. Except for when it isn’t required, and that isn’t all that often. And as it turns out in this particular case, the fact that Mr. Grace didn’t show up at one point was enough for SCOV to reverse the case.

Here’s what happened. Mr. Grace lives in Ohio, but back in 2013 visited Vermont. He got pulled over and was ultimately arrested for and charged with a DUI. He didn’t feel the reason he was initially stopped was lawful, so he challenged the validity of the stop with a motion to suppress. The motion to suppress was scheduled for a hearing, which went forward in early 2015.

Quick break for readers who aren’t lawyers or who aren’t familiar with how our court system’s notices work. At the time of Mr. Grace’s case (and now), courts electronically send notices to attorneys, who then provide notice to the clients. Every attorney or firm has some method of providing notice—whether it is to send it electronically, or by a letter through the US Mail, or some other system. Hearing notices usually specify that defendants must be present, and warn that a warrant could be issued for failing to appear. SCOV has dealt with this issue in the past.

Certifiably Procedural

McClellan v. Haddock, 2017 VT 13

By Elizabeth Kruska

Ever have it when you just can’t seem to get out of the house? Or the office? Or wherever? You check all your pockets to make sure you’ve got your keys, your phone, your wallet, your whatever, and then you have them or you don’t, or worse yet, you leave and one of the things is left behind? It’s a long, sort of anxiety-filled day when you realize you left your wallet on the kitchen table and you just hope you don’t get pulled over or need to pay for anything before you get home. I don’t know about you, but I feel a little less than whole if I don’t have all the pieces with me.

Unfortunately, some parts of civil procedure are also a little bit like this. You need all the parts in order to make a go of things. For certain kinds of cases, including wrongful death actions, in order to pass go, a plaintiff has to attach certain additional pieces of proof to the complaint at the time it is filed. For a wrongful death case to go forward, it’s got to include a certificate of merit from the attorney certifying that the attorney has consulted with a doctor in the field, that the doc has set forth the necessary standard of care, that the doc accused didn’t meet that standard of care, and that the plaintiff can probably prove it.

This certificate of merit requirement was added to the Vermont statutes back in 2011 in an effort to get a handle on filing frivolous claims. About half the states have this requirement. It’s not terribly onerous, especially considering the fact that a plaintiff is going to have to hire an expert most of the time to testify about the appropriate standard of care anyway. I suppose there are going to be times when the action is so egregious that no expert is needed, but that’s not going to happen very much. If a prospective plaintiff can’t find an expert to consult for the certificate of merit, chances are pretty good the case doesn’t have legs and the plaintiff wouldn’t be in a spot to file it anyway. That’s the whole point of the requirement; don’t file non-meritorious claims. It keeps the courts free of those cases, and it saves prospective defendants from the time and expense of defending them.

Thursday, March 16, 2017

Bail, Revisited

State v. Bailey, 2017 VT 18

By Elizabeth Kruska

William Bailey is accused of manslaughter of his buddy, Daniel Hein. The facts, essentially, is that Bailey, Hein, and a couple other friends were out driving around the greater Rutland County, Vermont/Washington County, New York area (this appears to take place  all within the span of a few miles, albeit across state lines), and generally causing trouble. They broke into a farm stand to steal money to buy alcohol and then they were going to go break into another farm stand. They were smoking pot, too. So, not awesome decision making, but so far not inconsistent with being young and looking for something to do, where “something to do” includes burglary.

Somewhere along the way the crew went to a house to get a gun. A gun they had previously stolen. One of the kids came out with a gun, but it had no magazine inserted. There was some discussion about whether the gun was loaded or not. Daniel Hein challenged Bailey, and said something along the lines of, “if it isn’t loaded, pull the trigger.”

Saturday, March 11, 2017

Judge Talk

In re Guardianship of N.P.2017 VT 14

By Elizabeth Kruska

This is a reverse and remand to the Probate Division.

Here’s the scoop. The Probate Division has exclusive jurisdiction of guardianships. But, if there is also a pending child in need of supervision (CHINS) case happening in the Family Division, the Family Division gets jurisdiction of the situation. The reason is so that kids involved in the juvenile justice system aren’t stuck in a spot between two different courts, and also so that one court doesn’t make orders that are inconsistent with another court about the same matter.

Here, N.P. was taken into DCF custody in the fall of 2014 on a CHINS petition. Somewhere along the way, some people (relatives? Friends? Don’t know, and it doesn’t totally matter here) who were involved in N.P.’s life filed a petition for a guardianship of N.P. in the Probate Division.

Officer Negligent

State v. Hayes2016 VT 105

By Eric Fanning

Ok, so just to be clear at the outset, this case does not involve a cop on trial or under sanctions; I just like the sound of that name.  But it does involve a police officer and, you guessed it, whether or not some of his actions (or omissions, as you’ll soon see) amount to negligence.  If this is enough to tickle your fancy, read on.  If not, well you should keep reading anyway, because there’s more to this case that might interest you.

Ms. Hayes appealed her conviction of driving while intoxicated (DWI), second offense.  The fact that this is her second offense is worth pointing out because a DWI is what’s called a ‘predicate offense,’ which means it’s a crime that can be used to enhance the sentence of any later conviction.  In other words, if you have a DWI on your record, and then you got popped for another one, your penalty goes up, up, up!

Wednesday, March 8, 2017

Two Problems in One Appeal

State v. Scales, 2017 VT 6

By Elizabeth Kruska

Remember that time Prince changed his name to an unpronounceable symbol? Yeah, I remember. He did it because of issues with his recording contract, and you can read about that here. But, it didn’t change the fact that he was Prince and people still knew he was Prince, and people even referred to him as “The Artist Formerly Known As Prince.”

And lots of women! It’s still considered customary for women to change their names when they get married. Although, I told my mother when I was five I wasn’t doing that, and I stuck to it.

All this to say that sometimes people change their names, and that’s just how it goes. It doesn’t mean, necessarily, that someone’s being elusive, it just means they have a different name. Or sometimes people go by nicknames or just prefer to be called something other than the name on their birth certificate. And as someone named Elizabeth, there are probably no fewer than 27 different name-based nicknames I could have, not the least of which is Lizard-Breath, and which Every Elizabeth Ever (even this one and this one I assume) has been called.

Tuesday, March 7, 2017

Quiet, Please

State v. Prue, 2016 VT 98

By Charlie Buttrey

I have been practicing criminal law in Vermont since 1986. As a seasoned criminal defense attorney, I have a couple of suggestions to those who are considering committing a crime. One, do it alone. Two, don’t talk about it.

Allen Prue did not abide by either of these principles and is now serving a life sentence for his role in the brutal murder of 32-year-old Melissa Jenkins, a popular teacher at St. Johnsbury Academy in May of 2014.

After being convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder and attempted kidnapping, Prue appeals to the Vermont Supreme Court, raising four grounds for his appeal.

Proportions, Pockets, and Paybacks

Conant v. Entergy Corp., 2016 VT 74

By Thomas M. Kester

While in her employer’s parking lot, the claimant injured her ankle. The injury was reported to her employer, who reported the injury to its worker’s compensation insurer. Employer’s policy with the insurer required employer to reimburse all workers’ compensation benefits paid by insurer up to a capped amount. Essentially, the employer is the insurer.

There are two payment avenues for claimant’s injury in this matter: Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”) and a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). How the injury is classified also affects the type/amount of disability benefits an injured worker can receive. The classifications are broadly “occupational injury” (worked-related injury and unable to work) and “non-occupational injury” (non-work-related injury and unable to work). The CBA contains an offset for workers’ compensation benefits for occupational disabilities, meaning “a worker injured on the job will receive, subject to the terms of the Act and the CBA, 100% of his or her wages through a combination of benefits from both sources.” This table broadly summarizes the CBA’s and Act’s benefits for occupational and non-occupational injuries for this matter:



Evaporating COAs

State v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2016 VT 61

By Thomas M. Kester

Tick. Tock. 

Interlocutory appeals are nifty legal devices that allow an appeal during a proceeding, in this case, to determine whether the State is exempted from a six-year limitation for claims arising from damages to State waters due to groundwater contamination from gasoline additives. I’m not going to recount the facts here because I already did that and they don’t matter as much here. This is a statutory examination case. For you non-hyperlink clickers, here is the ten-cent factual recitation: chemical added to gasoline makes cars vroom-vroom better, chemical leaks into water sources, science people’s science shows chemical pollutes water sources, and VT legislature enacts law to stop using chemical. 

On June 5, 2014, the State sues Defendants and Defendants move to dismiss the complaint as being time-barred under the general six-year statute of limitations for civil actions. Why, you ask? Because the Vermont Legislature banned the chemical in May 2005 and the law become effective January 1, 2007. Let me show what this means with some lawyer math: six years + May 2005 = May 2011, and six years + January 1, 2007 = January 1, 2013. According to the Gregorian calendar system and because the 2012 Mayan apocalypse didn’t happen, June 5, 2014 occurred after both May 2011 and January 1, 2013. Defendant’s argue that the countdown began when the statute banning the gas chemical was either passed or effective, making the complaint filed after either [date + six-year] period. 

Sunday, March 5, 2017

Jailhouse Rock

In re Morales, 2016 VT 85

By Andrew Delaney

I argued before the SCOV when I was a law student. I also appeared on behalf of clients in court through working at my law school’s legal clinic. It was allowed because there was a rule that said it was okay so long as I got all my permission slips signed by responsible adults, which I’d done. But if I had just skipped all that and pretended to be a lawyer, that would’ve been unauthorized practice of law.

This case is interesting for a couple of reasons. First, it’s a criminal charge filed in the SCOV. You don’t see that every day. Second, it explores what unauthorized practice of law (UPL) means in relation to so-called “jailhouse lawyers”—probably not the ideal term to use in this case, but it’s what we’ve got and I’m getting a little off track.

Serendipity Morales is an inmate. She helped some of her fellow inmates with legal research and motion drafting. The Bennington State’s Attorney filed an information in the SCOV charging Ms. Morales with six counts of UPL. The basis was that she’d helped five other inmates. She didn’t request payment or get paid. The SCOV notes, “The State does not allege that Morales ever signed pleadings on behalf of the other inmates, held herself out as a licensed attorney, or received any payment for her services.”

Road Rage Reversal (in part)

State v. Gagne, 2016 VT 68

By Andrew Delaney

Mr. Gagne, in an apparent fit of road rage, “chased a couple across town, eventually pulling up next to their truck and pointing a rifle at them.” He filed a motion to suppress his alcohol breath test based on lack of a meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel. He believed that he was being recorded during his phone call. As it turns out, he was. The trial court denied the motion. Mr. Gagne was tried and a jury convicted him of “aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, and negligent operation of a vehicle.”

He appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court should’ve granted his motion to suppress; (2) the jury instructions were wrong; and (3) the aggravated assault, simple assault, and reckless endangerment convictions for the same conduct violate double jeopardy. The SCOV reverses the suppression ruling; upholds the jury instructions; and kicks out the simple assault charge on double jeopardy grounds.

Let’s go back to the beginning, shall we?

ABC

Great Northern Construction, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 2016 VT 126

By Elizabeth Kruska

Here’s an unemployment case! And it’s not even about someone being unemployed, it’s about a company getting audited by the state for allegedly having not paid its unemployment taxes with respect to two employees. The Employment Security Board (ESB) the company didn’t pay for 2 employees for a couple years, and as a result owed the principal and penalties. The employer and the employees said this wasn’t necessary because the employees were actually independent contractors. SCOV, like the Jackson 5, said this is as easy as A, B, C. And as simple as do re mi. No, SCOV didn’t say that second part, but I wish they had.

The employer here is Great Northern Construction, or GNC. This has to do with construction, not vitamins and supplements—that’s the other GNC. The employees/contractors were O’Connor and LaPointe. Using a test called the ABC test, SCOV determines that with respect to O’Connor, ESB got it wrong and that he actually is an independent contractor. They affirm the ESB with respect to LaPointe, saying he really is an employee.

GNC does general construction, and has been in business in Vermont since the 70s. O’Connor also does construction, and specializes in historic renovation. He has an LLC and is available to work for any company that needs him. He owns specialized equipment to help with his work. Over the years he has built a good relationship with GNC and does a lot of work for them. It’s common for them to get in touch with him before starting a project to see if it’s something he can do. If he can, and when he works on a project, he sets his own hours and schedule, and gets paid by the project. At one point GNC tried to hire O’Connor, but he preferred to continue as an independent contractor, as that was more financially beneficial for him.

It Doesn’t Fit

In re B&M Realty, LLC, 2016 VT 114

By Elizabeth Kruska

Full disclosure: I live in Windsor County and for many years have regularly traveled past the parcel of land at issue in this case.

Exit 1 on Interstate 89 actually dumps out in two places. If you’re involved in the northbound side of 89, you enter or exit at a ramp on Route 4 which is about three miles west of White River Junction. If you’re involved in the southbound side of 89, your entrance and exit is on a different spot of Route 4 about five miles west of White River Junction. There’s a gas station and a couple other businesses near this exit, but no other commercial development to speak of.

Between the two exits there is a fairly large, sweeping curve, and an overpass bridge that is somehow inexplicably always icy. I also once randomly saw a sheep on that bridge. I called the Hartford police because I didn’t want the animal to get hit, and the dispatcher immediately said, “Are you calling about the sheep? We know all about it.” All that to say (sheep not withstanding) that this isn’t exactly an ordinary interstate interchange.